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INTRODUCTION
There is currently an information-age rush to find and patent
all genetic nuggets of information. The players in this race, prima-
rily corporations with research interests, see the area of gene patent-
ing as a potential goldmine.1 The first to isolate a new gene or gene
1 See, e.g., Margaret Graham Tebo, The Big Gene Profit Machine, 87 A.B.A. J. 46, 47-48 (Apr.
2001) (describing how the evolution of patent rights in biological material has evolved into
being worth potentially billions of dollars over time). Gene patents are highly valued for
their relevance to commercial products; for example, the patent on the BRCA-1 gene that
identifies breast cancer is seen as highly valuable because the patent allows its owner to
essentially exclude all others from using the genetic marker to provide a commercial test
HeinOnline  -- 2 Hous. J. Health L. & Pol'y 108 2002
sequence and identify its utility is rewarded a pot of gold with the
typical exclusionary rights conferred by a patent.2 In addition, the
perceived value of these sequences is further enhanced because the
stock market and popular press tend to exalt the discovery of each
speck of gold as if it were a discovery of an actual cure.3 However,
as in a traditional case of gold-digging, there is a discrete amount of
rare, valuable material that is embedded amidst much more useless
information.4 Luck typically plays a role; a select few who persevere
to comb through material are rewarded with gold, although those
rewarded are not necessarily those who worked the hardest.
The fortunes of some genetic gold-diggers are substantially en-
hanced by interactions with certain patients.5 In particular, some pa-
tients may contribute unique genetic material that essentially
without first paying a license fee. See, e.g., Sheldon Krimsky, The Profit of Scientific Discov-
ery and its Normative Implication, 75 CIn.-KENr L. Rtv. 15, 37 (1999) (noting that the patent
on BRCA-1 and BRCA-2 has resulted in screening test costs of about $ 2400). Moreover,
since there are nearly innumerable genes and gene markers, gold-diggers see a multitude
of small gold nuggets that each can lead to riches. See, e.g., Kristen Philipkoski, Incyte
Incites Concern, WmER Naivs (Feb. 16, 2000), at http://www.wired.com/news/techno
logy/0,1282,34372,00.html (noting plans to file patent applications on 15,000 gene se-
quences); Kristen Philiposki, Celera a Cinch in Patent Race, WmED NEws (Jan. 11, 2000), at
http://www.wired.com/news/print/0,1294,33551,00.htm; Ronald Kotulak, Taking Li-
cense with Your Genes, Biotech Firms Say They Need Protection, Cme. TrUB., Sept. 12,1999, at Cl
[hereinafter "Taking License with Your Genes"] (discussing Amgen's estimated $100 million
patent on an important blood forming hormone discovery).
2 See infra notes 22-27 and accompanying text (explaining the patentability of genes and
gene sequences).
3 See, e.g., Michael Waldholz, Genes are Patentable; Less Clear is if Finder Must Know Their Role:
AIDS Discovery Spurs Some to Challenge a Filing that Boosted HGS Stock, WALL ST. J., Mar. 16,
2000 at Al (noting that when investors believed that HGS was the sole discoverer of a
breakthrough in AIDS research, its shares rose tremendously).
4 In the case of gene patents, scientists must remove much 'junk DNA" to reach isolated and
purified material that can then be potentially patentable. See, e.g., Rebecca S. Eisenberg,
Intellectual Property at the Public-Private Divide: The Case of Large-Scale DNA Sequencing, 3 U.
Cu. L. ScH. ROUNTABLE 557,558 (1996) (explaining how complementary DNA sequences
are created through the use of enzymes to redact 'junk DNA"); Dorothy R. Auth, Are Ests
Patentable?, 15 NATURE BIOTEC¢HNOLOGY 911, 912 (1997) (describing the practice of patent-
ing portions of DNA with no known function).
5 For the purposes of this article, gold-diggers include both those who intentionally seek out
genetic patents using patient contributors, as well as those who seek patents more generi-
cally, but have no qualms about patenting the results based upon patient contributors
without any recognition or compensation to these contributors. In some cases, the gold-
diggers are not necessarily maliciously denying rights to patients; rather, because of the
complex dynamics of research and patent licensing, gold-diggers with patent rights often
have no personal contact with the contributing patients. See infra notes 61-62 and accompa-
nying text (contrasting patient perspectives with research realities, including the commer-
cial overtones).
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provides a short-cut to where the gold lies.6 Patients typically pro-
vide this valuable information without any knowledge that they are
helping gold-diggers who will be unlikely to share the eventual pot
of gold. In addition, even after patients realize that there is a pot of
gold at stake, they are usually unsuccessful in getting a fair share of
any nuggets of gold under the current patent law. Moreover, al-
though patients who help pave the way to genetic gold usually do
so for altruistic reasons, such as accelerating the discovery of a cure,
they ironically become unwitting accessories to a situation where
they, and other patients, will be precluded from the results of their
help if a patent is obtained. This occurs because a patent owner has
the right to prevent all others from encroaching on the patented in-
vention; most patent owners today, including academic institutions
and hospitals, utilize this right to charge higher prices for patented
inventions, including new medicines or medical treatments.7 In ad-
dition, while the patent owner's right of exclusion has been tradi-
tionally justified as an incentive or a reward to those who discover
patentable information that is then shared with society, this reward
seems perverse to patients who believe that they contributed just as
much, if not more, towards the pot of gold.8 Accordingly, patient
contributors are left feeling like they are tour guides to the land of
gold, but always excluded from the rewards reaped by those who
follow them.
This article focuses on the current clash between patient per-
spectives and patent law, with respect to who should be entitled to
the pot of gold that lies in patent rights. The focus on patient con-
tributors advances the important issue regarding appropriate com-
pensation, as well as whether current patent law definitions of
inventorship and ownership are outdated. This article provides an
6See infra notes 42-43 (describing how researchers have sought out isolated populations
because their limited genetic diversity accelerates the progress of research).
7 See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (1994) (noting that patent owner has the right to exclude others from
the patented invention); see also infra notes 53-63 and accompanying text (describing pa-
tient perceptions).
8 See infra notes 56-68 and accompanying text (describing patient perceptions that they
made substantial contributions to the patented invention). However, it should be noted
that in the area of biotechnology, patents, as well as the high prices of patented medicines
have often been justified because of enormous research and development costs in this
area. Ceci Connolly, Price Tag for a New Drug: $802 Million, WASH. POST, Dec. 1, 2001, at
A10 (noting that Tufts University researchers recently calculated the cost of developing a
new drug to reach $802 million, whereas another consumer group alleges the numbers are
less than $300 million). Nonetheless, where patients provide a genetic short cut, they are at
least arguably reducing the costs for companies, with no personal gain to themselves.
HeinOnline  -- 2 Hous. J. Health L. & Pol'y 110 2002
important foundation of underlying issues, and explains the present
failure of the patent system to accommodate and provide incentives
to the patients who offer the unique ability to facilitate research. Al-
though this article addresses potential short-term solutions under
patent and contract law, it takes an important step beyond prior
scholarship by drawing from multiple disciplines to promote an en-
during and satisfying solution for patient contributors. 9
Part I of this article begins with an introduction to patent laws
and underlying policies to provide a basic foundation for the perti-
nent legal issues. Part II then highlights the present dichotomy be-
tween the perspectives of patients with the present research reality,
including the prominent role of patents. After fully describing the
backdrop of the situation, Part HI explains the legal implications of
patient contributions under the present patent law. Section A begins
by underscoring the importance of the inventorship concept in
United States patent law. Then, Section B addresses the current law
governing inventorship to explain why patient efforts in assisting
with gold-digging have yet to provide them with the actual gold
that inures to joint inventors.
This article then turns to potential methods of addressing pa-
tients' concerns in Part IV. Section A begins by considering whether
an extension of joint inventorship law to include patients would ad-
equately address patient concerns first articulated within Part I.
This section suggests that underlying policies of patent law as well
as joint inventorship could be interpreted to embrace patient con-
tributors. However, this section concludes that including patients as
joint inventors may nonetheless fail to provide patient contributors
with a desired result because of a potential change in patent law.
After concluding that joint inventorship may not address patient
concerns completely, section B considers whether a contractual ap-
proach would be realistic. However, this section ultimately con-
9 For prior proposals suggesting immediate reform, see Marty Taylor Danforth, Note, Cells,
Sales, and Royalties: The Patient's Right to a Portion of the Profits, 6 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 179,
193-95 (1988) (proposing a licensing scheme with a fixed fee set by Congress); Roy
Hardiman, Note, Toward the Right of Commerciality: Recognizing Property Rights in the Com-
mercial Value of Human Tissue, 34 UCLA L. REv. 207, 263 (1986) (advocating creating prop-
erty rights in the human body); Christopher S. Pennisi, Note, More on Moore: A Novel
Strategy for Compensating the Human Sources of Patentable Cell-Line Inventions Based on Ex-
isting Law, 11 FoD-Ahs INrrL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 747, 778 (2001) (proposing a right
to compensation based upon the "shop right doctrine" under patent law, or an alternative
informed consent procedure). See also Radhika Rao, Property, Privacy and the Human Body,
80 B.U. L. REv. 358, 459-60 (2000) (concluding that the property and privacy interests in
human body parts are applicable differently to living and deceased persons).
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cludes that although patients can attempt to individually negotiate
their preferences, this approach is unlikely to provide most patients
with a workable solution. Section C then considers whether the
sanction of an unenforceable patent could address patient concerns.
Section D moves beyond the short-term solutions to suggest a
more comprehensive view of the problem. In particular, this section
suggests specific areas that have analogous problems to the patient
contributor issue, as a means towards reaching solutions that will be
longer lasting and more efficacious. For example, this section raises
the analogous issue of scientific authorship in an era where it is
often difficult to provide proper credit to all contributors. In addi-
tion, the patient contributor problems are analogized to those of
database creators, in considering whether the sui generis approach of
the database creators would be helpful. Also, a comparison of pa-
tient contributor problems with the long-standing problem of indus-
trial use of indigenous resources, often referred to as "bio-piracy,"
will be sketched briefly to highlight another area upon which pa-
tient advocates may consider in formulating a new-order solution.
Finally, this section returns to patent law approaches, but suggests a
broadened perspective of inventorship that considers not only pa-
tient contributors, but appropriate inventorship of all isolated ge-
netic material, regardless of how it was derived.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Patent Law and Policy
United States patent laws and policy are founded upon the
Constitution, which authorizes Congress to "promote the progress
of science and useful arts by securing for limited times to authors
and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and
discoveries." 10 Consistent with this mandate, Congress enacted the
Patent Act, which gives inventors a right of exclusivity in the form
of patent protection if certain requirements are met. In particular, a
patent provides an inventor with the right to exclude all others from
use of the invention during the term of the patent." Exclusivity is
10 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
H See Patent Act of 1790, 1 Stat. 109 (1790) ("An Act to Promote the Progress of Useful
Arts."); see also EDWARD C. WALTERSCHEID, To PROMOTE THE PROGRESS OF UsEFUL ARTS:
AMERICAN PATENT LAW AND ADMINISTRATION, 1798-1836, at 35-36 (1998) (noting that the
framers elected for a system of providing exclusive rights, rather than other types of re-
wards known at the time such as medals, titles or bounties).
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considered essential in order to "stimulate ideas and the eventual
development of further significant advances."'1 2 The requirements
for patentability under the Patent Act are similarly intended to ful-
fill the constitutional mandate of promoting innovation. 1
3
The Patent Act requires that for an invention to be patentable it
must (1) constitute "patentable subject matter," (2) meet the techni-
cal requirements for patentability, which require that the invention
be "new," "useful," and '"nonobvious,"'14 and (3) disclose a written
description of an invention, including the best mode of carrying it
forth.'5 Although a patent must disclose an invention that fits within
at least one statutory class of subject matter, the classes are very
broad and expansively interpreted to effectuate the policy of pro-
moting innovation. 16 The technical requirements are intended to en-
sure that the exclusive right is only provided in cases where an
invention will be of value to the public by requiring that a patented
invention be not only new, but also not so obvious that it could be
readily determined.17
The U.S. Supreme Court has explained that the federal patent
system reflects a "carefully crafted bargain"--a social contract be-
tween the inventor and society-that encourages innovation and
promotes increased knowledge in the public domain.'8 The grant of
12 See, e.g., Kewanee Oil v. Bicron, 416 U.S. 470, 481 (1974).
13 See, e.g., Bonito Boats v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 156 (1989).
14 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-03 (1994) (detailing the statutory definitions).
Is The application that becomes a patent must disclose the invention with sufficient definite-
ness such that someone of like ability-usually referred to as a person of "ordinary skill in
the art"-could replicate the invention by following the patent. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1994).
In addition, the application must disclose the best way of practicing the invention known
to the inventor at the time the application is filed. 35 U.S.C. § 112.
16 See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1994) (stating that patentable subject matter includes any process, ma-
chine, manufacture, or composition of matter); Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303,308-
09 (1980). In particular, it has been noted that the "subject-matter provisions of the patent
law have been cast in broad terms to fulfill the constitutional and statutory goal of promot-
ing 'the progress of science and the useful arts' with all that means for the social and
economic benefits envisioned by Jefferson." Id. at 315.
17 See Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 156 (noting that "both the novelty and the nonobviousness
requirements of federal patent law are grounded in the notion that concepts within the
public grasp, or those so obvious that they readily could be, are the tools of creation avail-
able to all"). Of course, there are those who contend that these technical requirements
either are ineffective, or not strong enough to truly weed out irrelevant inventions. See,
e.g., James Gleick, Patently Absurd, N.Y. TumIs MAc., Mar. 12, 2000, at 44. But see Patenting
Business Methods: A White Paper of the AIPLA, AIPLA, Nov. 27, 2000, at http://www.aipla.
org/html/whitepaper2.htlm (advocating no change in the patent laws for business
method patents).
Is See Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 149.
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a patent is both an incentive to create and a reward for disclosure of
the invention to the public.19 The patentability requirements serve to
ensure the validity of the social contract by requiring the inventor to
disclose something of value to society in exchange for the right to
exclude. 20 Disclosure benefits the public immediately because upon
issuance of a patent, which is a public document,21 the knowledge in
the patent is immediately available to the public and can be instru-
mental to furthering innovation by others. Although use of the in-
vention during the term of the patent is not available without
authorization from the patent owner, the disclosed invention is im-
mediately accessible upon expiration of the limited patent term.
B. Patent Law, Policy and Genetic Material
1. Patentability
To most patients, as well as the public, the idea of patenting
genes and gene sequences seems counter-intuitive. One frequently
voiced opinion is that because genes are living material, they should
not be patented.22 However, the United States Patent Office (PTO)
has long considered isolated and purified genetic material to be pat-
entable, based on the premise that the isolated material does not
exist naturally in that state and therefore is not a mere discovery;
isolated material is typically created through recombinant DNA
techniques to result in a more "concentrated" product than that
which could exist in nature.23 Although this issue remains contro-
versial in some international communities,24 it is essentially settled
19 See, e.g., Kewanee Oil, 416 U.S. at 480 (noting that patents provide both an incentive to risk
time, research and development, as well as a reward for disclosure of an invention).
20 See id. at 480-81.
21 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 10-11, 13 (1994) (discussing the availability of patents to the public).
22 See, e.g., David Resnik, DNA Patents and Human Dignity, 29 J.L. MED & ETHIcs 152 (2001)
(discussing objections to genetic patenting on human dignity grounds).
23 See, e.g, Genentech v. Chiron Corp., 112 F.3d 495, 501 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (affirming a patent
for a DNA sequence); Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d 1200 (Fed. Cir. 1991)
(upholding a patent on the purified and isolated gene sequence which encodes human
erythropoietin); Lila Feisee & Brian Stanton, Are Biotechnology Patents important?, PTO
PULsE, Mar. 2000, at www.uspto.gov/go/opa/pulse/200003.htm (last visited Apr. 7,
2002); Biotechnology Industry Organization, Backgronnder on Patenting Gene-Based Inven-
tions, Genomics: Issues and Policies, Mar. 2000, at http//:www.bio.org/genomics/gene
based.html (noting that the PTO policy allowing the patentability of genes, expressed se-
quence tags, and single nucleotide polymorphisms is "well established" and has already
resulted in many issued patents).
24 See, e.g., Cynthia M. Ho, International Intellectual Property Issues for Biotechnology, in ENCY-
CLOPEDIA OF ETHICAL, LEGAL, AND POLICY ISSUES IN BIOTECHNOLOGY 761, 766-69 (Thomas J.
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in the United States that isolated genetic material is patentable sub-
ject matter.-5 However, it should be recalled that patentability re-
quires both that there be patentable subject matter and that the
subject matter also satisfy the technical patentability criteria.26
The application of technical patentability criteria to genetic in-
ventions is still an evolving process. The Patent Act establishes that
all the technical criteria of patentability - utility, novelty and nonob-
viousness - must be met for all inventions before a patent is issued.
However, the application of these criteria to genetic inventions has
not been static. For example, at one point isolated genes satisfied
the utility requirement, even if their only known utility was as a
genetic probe for further material.27 However, the PTO recently
stated that genetic applications must now establish "substantial and
credible utility," - a standard intended to require that genetic pat-
ents must have more utility than merely being a gene.28 In other
words, a patentable gene or gene sequence must have at least identi-
fied functionality or an associated protein, in order to satisfy the
utility requirement.
Murray & Maxwell J. Mehlman, eds., 2000) (summarizing types of biotechnology consid-
ered patentable subject matter in various countries); Donna M. Gitter, International Con-
flicts Over Patenting Human DNA Sequences in the United States and the Enropean Union: An
Argument for Compulsory Licensing and a Fair-Use Exemption, 76 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1623, 1627-28
(2001) (noting the continuing controversy in Europe over the patenting of human DNA
sequences based on perceived lack of utility, as well as morality concerns). In addition,
even for countries that allow some genetic material to be patentable, the scope of patenta-
bility may vary greatly, depending on the definitions of the technical requirements of nov-
elty, utility and nonobviousness. See, e.g., Carlos Correa, Patent Rights, in INTELLECTuAL
PROPERTY AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE: THE TRIPS AGREEMENT 198 (Carlos M. Correa &
Abduiqawi A. Yusuf, eds. 1998); J.H. Reichman, From Free Riders to Fair Followers: Global
Competition under the TRIPS Agreement, 29 INT'L L. & POL. 11, 29-32, 36-39 (1996-97) (dis-
cussing the lack of universal standards of technical requirements of patentability, as well
as specific issues for biotechnology).
2 See, e.g, supra note 23 (citing authority that accepts isolated genetic material as patentable
subject matter under United States laws); see also infra notes 27-30 and accompanying text
(discussing modifications to the technical requirements of patentability, without question-
ing that subject matter is appropriate).
26 See supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text (explaining technical requirements of
patentability).
27 See, e.g., Patent and Trademark Office Utility Examination Guidelines, 60 Fed. Reg. 36263,
36264 (July 15, 1995) (noting that utility is established so long as the applicant makes an
assertion that would be credible to a person of ordinary skill in field); Arti Rai, Regulating
Scientific Research: Intellectual Properh Rights and the Norms of Science, 94 Nw. U. L. Ray. 77,
106-09 (1999) (describing liberalization of utility requirement).
28 See Patent and Trademark Office Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 1092, 1098
(Jan. 5, 2001) (detailing the utility requirement for patent examiners).
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Regardless of the evolving application of technical patentabil-
ity criteria to genetic inventions, gene patents have issued and will
likely continue to issue in the foreseeable future.29 In particular, the
propriety of patenting genetic material is unlikely to be seriously
challenged in the United States anytime in the near future.30 Accord-
ingly, the remainder of this article will assume that genetic inven-
tions will continue to be patentable and will address other issues
attendant to the issuance of these patents.
2. Inventorship versus Ownership
Inventorship and ownership are distinct, but often related, is-
sues. The inventor creates the patented invention whereas the pat-
ent owner holds the rights inherent in a patent.31 It is possible that
the inventor is also the patent owner; in fact, the default rule in the
29 See, e.g., Tebo, supra note 1, at 48 (noting recent statistics from the PTO indicating that 1000
patent applications involving human or animal DNA have been filed, in addition to 200
already issued patents); John Carey, The Genome Gold Rush, Bus. WK., June 12, 2000, at 147,
152 (illustrating that even junk DNA may be patentable); Pamela Sherrid, It's All About
Cures and Cash, 130 U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Jan. 8, 2001, at 35 (noting that genomics
companies have been flooding the patent office with thousands of applications); Taking
License With Your Genes, supra note 1, at Cl (noting that there are over 7,000 pending pat-
ent applications on genetic patents).
30 This is especially true since the United States Supreme Court recently gave strong affirm-
ance to the principle of broad subject matter patentability in upholding the patentability of
plants despite overlapping protection provided under both the Plant Patent Act as well as
the Plant Variety Protection Act. See J.E.M. AG Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-bred Int'l, Inc,
122 S.Ct. 593, 596 (2001); see also Martin Bobrow & Sandy Thomas, Patents in a Genetic Age,
409 NATURE 763 (Feb. 15, 2001) (noting that thousands of patent claims to human DNA
sequences have been filed and granted and few have been subject to legal challenge thus
far). However, even United States patents on genetic material are not without controversy.
See, e.g., Affordable Prescription Drugs and Medical Inventions Act, H.R. 1708, 107th
Cong. (2001) (proposing an amendment to the Patent Act to allow for compulsory licens-
ing of certain inventions relating to health); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Re-Examining the Role of
Patents in Appropriating the Value of DNA Sequences, 49 EMORY L. J. 783 (2000) (discussing
whether patentability is appropriate for DNA sequences); Cynthia M. Ho, Splicing Morality
and Patent Law: Issues Arising from Mixing Mice and Men, 2 J. L. & PoL'Y 247 (2000) (discuss-
ing resurgent argument against patenting of biological inventions that invoke overtones of
morality, as well as providing comparative perspective of European Patent System, which
expressly includes morality as a consideration in the evaluation of patentability). In addi-
tion, the tension in this area is also evident from recently proposed, but un-enacted Con-
gressional bills to limit the enforceability of some such patents. See Genomic Science and
Technology Act of 2002, H.R. 3966, 107th Cong. (2002); Genomic Research and Diagnostic
Accessibility Act of 2002, H.R. 3967, 107th Cong. (2002).
3' See Beech Aircraft Corp. v. EDO Corp., 990 F.2d 1237, 1248 (Fed. Cir. 1993) ("It is elemen-
tary that inventorship and ownership are separate issues... [lInvertorship is a question of
who actually invented the subject matter claimed in a patent ... who ultimately possesses
ownership rights ... has no bearing whatsoever on the question of who actually invented
that subject matter.").
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United States is that a patent is granted to the inventor.32 However,
because patents can be conveyed like other types of property, the
inventor may assign his interest in the patent; in such a case, some-
one other than the inventor would own the patent.3
From the perspective of patentability, inventorship is of pri-
mary importance, while ownership is a mere housekeeping issue.
As discussed earlier, a patent can only be granted to inventions that
are shown to be new, useful, and nonobvious.34 To establish these
technical requirements, inventors must certify that they believe
themselves to be the first to have discovered the invention.3 The
PTO independently assesses whether the technical requirements of
patentability are met by comparing the patent application to the in-
ventions of others, commonly referred to as "prior art"
comparison.36
Ownership issues are irrelevant to patentability, except to the
extent that joint ownership of inventions may help to avoid an obvi-
ousness rejection.37 In addition, ownership of patent rights is contin-
gent upon the initial patentability inquiry succeeding in the first
instance. Although rights may be transferred with regard to a pend-
3 See, e.g., Teets v. Chromalloy Gas Turbine Corp., 83 F.3d 403, 407 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (noting
that an invention presumptively belongs to its creator).
33 The Patent Act actually explicitly clarifies that patents "shall have the attributes of per-
sonal property." 35 U.S.C. § 261 (1994).
34 See supra note 14 and accompanying text. In addition, the patent application must suffi-
ciently describe the invention such that a person of similar experience could replicate the
invention. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1994). The application must also disclose the best method
of using the invention, as of the time of the application. 35 U.S.C. § 112.
5 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103, 111 (1994) (listing the patentability requirements and oath re-
quirement); see also 37 C.F.R. 1.63; U.S. DEP'T OF CoMMERCE, PATENT AND TRADEMARK O-
FICE, MANUAL OF PATENT ExAMuINNG PROCEDURE 602, 600-26-29 (7th ed. 1998; rev. 2000)
[hereinafter "MPEP"], available at http//:www.uspto.gov/web/office/pac/mpep/mpep.
html. Because the patent laws are intended to further the progress of science and also
promote the disclosure of inventions, the patent laws do have provisions that bar patenta-
bility to inventors who unduly delay in requesting patents. See Checkpoint Sys., Inc. v.
U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 54 F.3d 756 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (noting the dual purposes of re-
warding the first patent inventor and also prompt disclosure).
3 See MPEP, supra note 35, at 2100-8-15. This process includes not only what other inventors
have done, but may also include acts of the inventor himself in certain situations where an
inventor is considered to have not timely requested a patent after having discovered it. See
35 U.S.C. §§ 102(b), 102(g) (1994).
3 See 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1994); MPEP, supra note 35, at 700-1 to 700-177 (describing the PTO
prior art examination and providing no consideration of ownership, except with regard to
avoiding an obviousness rejection).
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ing patent application, the assignment of title is merely a procedural
issue.38
II. THE PATIENT-PATENT INTERPLAY
A. The Patient Input
The specific factual scenarios that give rise to patentable sub-
ject matter are important because they help to provide a context for
patient perspectives, as well as implications for patent law and pol-
icy. Accordingly, before addressing the specific patent issues raised
by patient contributions, some typical situations in which patients
provide biological material that eventually leads to a patent will be
outlined.
1. Sample Scenarios
a. "Normal" Course of Treatment
Occasionally, a patient will have biological material removed
from her body during the normal course of medical treatment. This
biological material may subsequently be used for experimentation,
although Moore v. Regents of the University of California is the only
published case where the material eventually resulted in a patent.39
Thus far, courts consider patients to have no property interest in
materials removed from their body attendant to the normal course
of treatment. 4° Of even greater consequence in the context of patent
issues, however, is that other than in a case of extreme breach of
fiduciary duty, patients who have biological material removed dur-
3 See supra note 33 and accompanying text (noting that patents may be assigned). There are
rules that permit a patent to issue to an inventor's assignee immediately upon patent
grant. See 35 U.S.C. § 152 (1994) (noting that patents may be granted to the assignee of the
inventor). Pre-assignment of patent rights is often the norm. For example, employment
agreements typically pre-ordain that any patents created on the premises shall be assigned
to the corporation; inventions that resulted from research done in the course of work for a
corporate entity are usually assigned to the corporation. See, e.g., Lucy Gamon, Note,
Patent Law in the Context of Corporate Research, 8 J. CORP. L. 497, 498 (1983). In addition,
assignment of inventions created in an academic context are also common. See, e.g., Chou
v. Univ. of Chi., 254 F.3d 1347, 1356-57 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (affirming a district court holding
that a university scientist could assign all her patent rights to her university employer
even without an actual contract because her acceptance of her academic post was subject
to the faculty handbook which included a provision for assignment of inventions). See
generally Steven Cherensky, A Penny For Their Thoughts: Employee-Inventors, Preinvention
Assignment Agreements, Property, and Personhood, 81 CAL. L. REv. 595, 602-04 (1993).
39 See e.g., Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 480 (Cal. 1990).
40 See e.g., id.
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ing the routine course of medical treatment are unlikely to be aware
of the taking or subsequent profits arising from their contribution.41
Accordingly, such patients are unlikely to be even aware of any re-
sulting patent profits.
b. Doctors Who Seek out "Special" Populations
As early as the 1970s, scientists have been seeking out isolated
populations with unique gene pools because of the increased chance
of scientific success. In particular, studies of isolated populations
with common genes can ease the scientific path to discovery of ge-
netic disorders by limiting the number of variables with which
scientists must contend.42 Scientists can more easily find genetic
markers by comparing genetic profiles of all individuals in an iso-
lated population who suffer from a genetic disorder, compared with
those who do not. In addition, isolated populations often more eas-
ily yield extensive genealogies and other health information that
may further assist scientific research. For example, the discovery of
the breast cancer gene, BRCA-1, was achieved after a decade of sam-
pling and testing Mormon families in Utah who had genetic com-
monality, as well as extensive genealogy information available to
researchers. 43
c. Special Patients Who Seek Researchers
In addition to scientists who seek out special populations, pa-
tients may present themselves for research. This is particularly true
for patients suffering from presently incurable diseases; in such
cases, there is a high incentive for patients to volunteer blood and
41 However, in one particularly egregious case of breach of fiduciary duty, patient John
Moore's doctor not only took out a diseased organ, but required the patient to make re-
peated return trips to provide additional biological material including blood and semen
samples that were not actually medically necessary. Id. at 481-82.
4 2 See, e.g., LoPi ANDREvS & DOROTHY NELUM, BODY BAZAAR: THE MARKET FOR HUMAN TIS-
suE iN THE BIOTEcHNOLoGY AGE 43-44 (2001).
43 See, e.g., id. Another isolated group that has been utilized for genetic testing is the Amish
in Pennsylvania. Id. at 42-43; see also Robin Marantz Henig, Tricky Truths About Ethnicity
and Genetics, WASH. POST, Oct 5, 1997, at C1 (noting the efficiencies of screening a selected
population with similar genes, such as Ashkenazi Jews). Similarly, some companies have
sought and obtained even larger populations of relatively pure samples in Iceland and
Canada. See, e.g., Henry T. Greely, Iceland's Plan for Genomics Research: Facts and Implica-
tions, JUmMTrRIcs 153 (2000); see also Michael J. Smith, Comment, Population-Based Genetic
Studies: Informed Consent and Confidentiality, 18 SANTA CARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J.
57, 68-72 (2001) (discussing similar projects in Estonia, as well as proposed studies in the
United Kingdom, Italy, Tonga, and even the U.S. in limited instances).
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other biological material with the hope that scientists will more
readily identify a genetic marker that can result in specific
treatment.
In addition, some people have presented themselves or others
to doctors for research purposes when there is no clear disease, but
there are anomalous symptoms. For example, one man presented
himself for research when he realized that he had been repeatedly
exposed to the AIDS virus, but never contracted the virus himself.44
Similarly, one woman presented her cat for study when it showed
signs typical of immunodeficiency, but failed to test for feline leuke-
mia, which was the only known immunodeficiency disorder in cats
at the time.45
In addition, patients sometimes present not only themselves,
but may also locate similarly afflicted people and present the com-
bined biological material for researchers to study. For example,
Nancy Wexler, a psychologist who had a substantial genetic risk of
Huntington's disease, spearheaded the discovery and collection of
blood samples from a concentrated population of family members
in Venezuela. 46 Similar situations have resulted in the location of
genes that cause cystic fibrosis and predispose patients to breast
cancer.47 More recently, the parents of a child born with Canavan
disease, a genetic disorder that leads to brain degeneration, re-
cruited a researcher, organized a nationwide collection of biomater-
44 Morley Safer, 60 Minutes: Whose Body Is It Anyway? Companies Patenting Genetic Makeups
(CBS television broadcast, Feb. 25, 2001) (noting that Steve Crohn offered himself up to the
Aaron Diamond AIDS Research Center in New York for study when he was puzzled as to
why he consistently tested negative for HIV despite regular exposure and became con-
vinced that he was carrying some kind of immunity).
45 See infra notes 134-57 and accompanying text (describing the case of MarIo Brown and the
negative legal reception she received for her claims before two different courts).
46 This enabled researchers to compare the genetic material of those afflicted with Hunting-
ton's versus their unafflicted relatives to accelerate the research process. See ALICE WEX-
LER, MAPPING FATE: A MEMOIR OF FAMILY, RISK AND GENETIC RESEARCH (1996); see also
ANDREWS & NELKIN, supra note 42 at 50; Thomas H. Maugh II, Unraveling the Secrets of
Genes: Genetic Experiments Have Exploded and Could Hold the Key to Making Such Diseases as
Cystic Fibrosis, Huntington's and Lou Gehrig's Obsolete, but Ethical Questions Remain, L.A.
TIMES, Oct. 31, 1993, at Al (describing the analysis performed on the genetic material of
cystic fibrosis, Huntington's and Lou Gehrig's disease patients); Gerardo Jimenez-
Sanchez, Human Disease Genes, 409 NATURE 853, 853-55 (Feb. 15, 2001) (focusing on the
protein produced by specific genes and choosing functional designations that were largely
informed by the features of pathology).
47 See supra note 43 and accompanying text (concerning the discovery of BRCA-1, the breast
cancer gene).
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ial, and also financed the research itself.48 Similarly, the patient-
based group PXE International established a bank of biological ma-
terial relating to the genetic disorder PXE, to assist research regard-
ing this disorder.49
2. Informed Consent
Each of the situations that give rise to patient contributions has
important implications for informed consent. In particular, the doc-
trine of informed consent requires that doctors, as well as research-
ers, explain their care or research prior to operating on patients,
removing material from them, or subjecting them to testing.50 In the
case of patient contributions, although a procedure for obtaining in-
formed consent is typically used, patients have a perception that
their consent was not truly informed, as will be discussed in the
next section.
To provide a foundation for evaluating patient perceptions, it
is important to first understand the basic requirements of informed
consent, as well as how it is usually obtained. On a practical level,
the doctrine of informed consent has evolved into a disclosure form
that states the procedure to be done and its associated risks. Pa-
tients are asked to sign the form to indicate their assent to the proce-
dure after being apprised of the risks.-' Some of these forms also
request the patient's consent to allow information obtained through
the procedure to be used for research purposes, without identifica-
tion of the individual patient. However, these forms typically do not
indicate that this research may culminate in a patent application, let
43 See Greenberg v. Miami Children's Hosp. Research Inst., Inc., 208 F. Supp. 2d 918, 921
(N.D. M. 2002). Over the course of seven years, the Greenbergs provided tissue and blood
samples of their family, including a tissue sample of their son's organs, after his death
from Canavan disease. Id at 921.
49 See, e.g., Paul Smaglik, Tissue Donors Use Their Influence in Deal Over Gene Patent Terms, 407
NATuRu 821 (Oct. 19, 2000); Matt Fleischer, Seeking Rights to Crucial Gene, NATIONAL L. J.,
June 25,2001, at Cl; Andy Coghlan, People With Inherited Diseases are Ready to Challenge Pro-
Lifers Over the Future of Medical Research, NEW SciENmsr, Feb. 2, 2001, at 4 (quoting the
chairman of PXE International as noting that patent ownership was desirable to "acceler-
ate the research process, control royalty and license fees, and eliminate turf wars between
researchers"). PXE is a relatively rare genetic disorder that causes connective tissue to
harden. Id. There was no known treatment for this disease when the patient group PXE
International was formed. Id.
50 See Moore v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479 (1990); RESTATEmENr (SEcoND) Op
TORTs, § 829B cmt. 1 (1979).
s The form may include other information that the patient is asked to consent to, including,
for example, agreement to release confidential information to insurers to secure
reimbursement.
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alone the fact that a patent would legally allow limited access to a
patented medical treatment.5 2
Moreover, even if a researcher did attempt to include potential
patents in the official consent form and a patient understood the im-
plications, it is still unclear whether this would impact the net out-
come.53 In particular, because many patients who donate biological
material are at a loss for other options because of the lack of existing
treatments, it is unclear whether they could properly evaluate the
pros and cons of consenting to patents derived from their dona-
tions.54 Any remote monetary consequences that may arise from
their participation may be irrelevant to patients who have no treat-
ment alternatives. In addition, patients without other avenues for
treatment may fail to appreciate that they could decline to waive
intellectual property rights based upon their contributions, let alone
attempt to bargain for different outcomes.55
3. Patient Perceptions
The patient perspective is a key component to addressing the
problems raised by patents based upon their contributions. As al-
ready noted, the largest gap exists between patient perception and
current reality with respect to the fact that a patent may result from
their contributions. A corollary gap in understanding is the fact that
52 The failure of the informed consent form to specifically indicate that patent rights may be
sought has been raised in at least one lawsuit. Greenberg, 208 F. Supp.2d at 921-22 (assert-
ing that the patients were not informed of any intent to seek a patent on the research for
which patients were assisting and alleging several causes of action, including lack of in-
formed consent, breach of fiduciary duty, unjust enrichment, and conversion). In addition,
most patients contend that the scientists they worked with never even mentioned that
their research might result in a patent application. Id. at 921 (noting the contrary expecta-
tion of patients that their contributions would be used to develop medical procedures that
would remain within the public domain); Moore, 793 P.2d at 485 (describing the fiduciary
duty a doctor owes a patient); see also ANDREWS & NELKIN, supra note 40, at 56 (listing the
conflicts researchers have as a factor for this problem); Fleischer, supra note 49, at A14
(describing how parents of blood donors did not know how their children's blood would
be used); Justin Gillis, Gene Research Success Spurs Profit Debate, WASH. POST, Dec. 30, 2000,
at Al (describing the donors as feeling exploited).
53 For example, an informed consent form could more explicitly require patients to waive
rights to future claims or interests in resulting intellectual property. However, because
most patients have, at best, a rudimentary understanding of patents, a consent form that
adequately explains the results of a patent may be difficult for patients to comprehend.
See infra notes 63-66 and accompanying text (explaining patient misperceptions concerning
patents).
54 See, e.g., Danforth, supra note 9, at 198.
-5 See infra notes 194-96 and accompanying text (discussing the "option" that patients have in
contracting for different outcomes).
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patents provide their owners with the right to exclude others, in-
cluding the potential to charge higher prices.56 Many patients im-
properly assume that all research and results based upon their
contributions will be made freely available to help other similarly
situated patients.5 7 Accordingly, patients are typically shocked
when they discover that their aid has actually resulted in limited
access to tests and treatments because their assistance resulted in a
patent, There are two central components to the patients' experi-
ence of shock and dismay: (1) an often false presumption about the
neutrality of doctors and researchers with whom they deal; and (2) a
lack of comprehension about patents.
a. Assumed Neutrality of Doctors and Researchers
Patient contributors typically assume that the scientists and
doctors with whom they interact are involved solely in the pursuit
of knowledge and are therefore immune to commercial interests.5 9
This assumption may stem, at least in part, from the patients' own
voluntary and philanthropic acts.6° In addition, patients may be un-
56 See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (1994) (providing that the patent owner has the right to exclude all
others from making, using, selling, offering to sell, or importing the patented invention);
Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29,33 (1964) (noting that "[a] patent empowers the owner to
exact royalties as high as he can negotiate with the leverage of that monopoly."); W. L.
Gore & Associates, Inc. v. Carlisle Corp., 381 F.Supp. 680, 701 (D. Del. 1974) (noting that
the patent right is about charging "what the market will bear").
57 See, e.g., Greenberg, 208 F. Supp.2d at 921 (noting patients' expectations that any resulting
tests would benefit the "population at large" and that patients were surprised to find that
organizations with free testing programs were threatened with litigation); Fleischer, Patent
Thyself, AM. LAWYER, at 84, 87 (une 2001) (noting that a number of families who donated
blood in the hopes of discovering a test for Canavan's disease had done so under the
assumption that the test would be available to all); Gillis, supra note 52, at Al (quoting one
contributing patient who was reacting in shock to the discovery of a patent based on his
contribution, "[a]ll of us felt that was a real slap in the face ... It was a common under-
standing that we were all doing this to benefit the common good.").
53 In one recent case, patients who provided biomaterial had no idea that the research they
sponsored would result in a patent; they only discovered the patent when the patent
owner, Miami Children's Hospital, began to limit testing by academic laboratories. See,
e.g., Greenberg, 208 F. Supp.2d at 921; Gillis, supra note 52, at Al.
5 Vicki Brower, Canavan Families Slam Scientists over Test Patent Profits, BIoTEcH. NEw-
swATCH, Dec. 4, 2000, at 1 (noting that they did not realize that the tissue they donated
would be used for profit, or to restrict use of any resulting tests to other families); see also
Gina Kolata, Sharing of Profits is Debated as the Value of Tissue Rises, N.Y. TUVIES, May 15,
2000, at A17 (quoting Michigan law professor Rebecca Eisenberg as noting that "people
may contribute their tissue in the expectation that nobody is going to make a profit on it,
but that's a little naive. There's no free lunch here.") Id.
60 See, e.g., Brower, supra note 59, at 1 (noting that the family of children who died of
Canavan's disease donated the brain tissue of their children to a researcher for testing).
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aware that doctors and researchers may have commercial interests
that ordinarily would not be disclosed during the course of medical
care or research.61 Moreover, even if a researcher does not person-
ally have a commercial interest, the fact that many researchers work
for commercial entities will result in commercialization of their re-
search. For example, in the Canavan case, the researcher was re-
quired to seek a patent by his employer, and in fact had assigned his
interests in any potential patents to his employer prior to the patient
contributions. 62
b. Patent System Misperception
Most patients do not comprehend the basis upon which pat-
ents are granted. In particular, while patients may be correct that it
was their "idea" that a genetic problem existed, patents are not
granted for ideas or observations alone.63 In most cases where pa-
tients have contributed biological material to scientists, the scope of
the actual patent is quite different from the mere concept that the
patient's genes were an anomaly. 64 In particular, scientists usually
must perform additional testing to determine the genetic marker
that controls for the anomaly and it is the discovery of the marker,
rather than the patient's identification of an aberration, that is
granted a patent.65
61 See, e.g., Alice Dembner, Research Integrity Declines, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 22, 2000, at E2
(describing commercialization of scientific research in the area of medical care); Penni
Crabtree, Front Prof to Profit; Money and Scientists Mingle, Creating Companies and Concerns,
S. D. UNION-TRIBUNE, Oct. 29, 2000, at H-1 (describing conflicts of interest.); see also Pilar N.
Ossorio, Pills, Bills & Shills: Physician-Researcher's Conflicts of Interest, 8 WID. L. Symi. J. 75,
77 (2001) (describing conflicts of interest for doctors who are also researchers); Janet Fleet-
wood, Conflicts of Interest in Clinical Research, 8 WID. L. SYmp. J. 105, 106-09 (2001) (listing
factors that hamper full disclosure of patient understanding of consent forms); Jennifer
Washburn, Informed Consent, WASH. POST MAG., Dec. 30, 20001, at W16 (describing the
conflict of interest of doctor-researchers with a focus on conflict of interests involved in
soliciting patients to join clinical studies).
62 See, e.g., Kolata, supra note 59, at A17 (noting that researcher Dr. Reubon Matalon's em-
ployment contract required that every invention he made would be owned by his em-
ployer); Gillis, supra note 52, at Al (noting that researcher and doctor Reuben Matalon was
obliged to tell the hospital that he worked for about the patentable discovery, which then
was applied for and granted to Miami University Children's Hospital).
63 Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kaola Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130-32 (1948). See generally 35
U.S.C. § 101 (1994).
64 See ifra note 100-76 and accompanying text (explaining why patient contributions, includ-
ing John Moore's, fail to rise to the level of inventorship).
65 See id.
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In addition, patients perceive the exclusivity inherent in patent
fights to be fundamentally inequitable. Patient contributors are
often affronted by the current scheme that enables patent owners to
charge heightened prices to everyone including those who contrib-
uted to the discovery of the invention.66 Accordingly, some patient
contributors are interested in patent ownership as a way of control-
ling access to patented inventions, or at least control of licensing of
the invention.67 In particular, when patients realize that someone
else is reaping profits based upon their contributions, the patients
may feel that the obvious equitable solution would be that they
must be entitled to a part of the thing, which creates profits, i.e. the
patent. This is particularly true for patients who claim that scientists
could not have created the patentable invention without their
assistance. 68
B. Research Reality
1. Commercial Interests
This section will clarify that the general perception among pa-
tients that doctors and scientists are principally devoid of commer-
cialism does not accurately reflect the current situation. There is a
growing body of literature regarding the increasing commercializa-
tion of science, particularly bio-medical sciences.69 For example, aca-
demic scientists in these areas often also have financial ties to
pharmaceutical and genomic industries.70 Moreover, regardless of
66 See, e.g., Greenberg, 208 F. Supp.2d at 921 (alleging that defendants earned significant royal-
ties from the resulting patent, as well as the fact that the researcher they worked with has
personally profited).
6 See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text (discussing PXE situation).
6 See, e.g., Safer, supra note 44 (quoting patient contributor Fuchs as stating that "without my
blood ... they would not have had this discovery" and that it was his idea that his im-
mune system was unique, such that he should share in the patent profits).
69 Kathleen Cranley Glass & Trudo Lemmens, Conflict of Interest and Commercialization of Bi-
omedical Research Office, in THE CoMMERCAzxATION OF GENETIC RESEARCH: ETHICAL, LE-
GAL ND POLICY ISSUES (Caufield & Williams-Jones, eds. 1999; OFMCE OF TECHNOLOGY
AssEssMENT, BIOTECHNOLOGY IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY 45-69 (1991)) (describing the financ-
ing of biotechnology); OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASsESSMENT, COMMERCIAL BIOTECHNOLOGY
411-30 (U.S. Gov't Printing Office 1991) (discussing relationships between university and
industry); Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d at 506-23 (Mosk, dissenting).
70 See, e.g., Krimsky, supra note 1, at 15-20 (giving the historical development of how scien-
tists interact with industry, focusing on molecular genetics); Zach W. Hall & Christopher
Scott, University-Industry Partnership, 291 SCIENCE 553 (2001) (editorializing about the rela-
tionship between universities and private industry in the biomedical research commu-
nity); Kolata, supra note 59, at A17 (quoting Professor Hank Greely of Stanford Law school
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any industrial ties, many universities currently view patents, partic-
ularly their potential licensing revenue, as one way to supplement
an ever-decreasing pool of federal funding for research. 71
Some of this commercialization, and particularly an increased
focus on patents in the bio-medical area, is often attributed to the
U.S. Supreme Court's 1980 holding in Diamond v. Chakrabarhy, that
genetically engineered bacteria could constitute patentable subject
matter; this decision has been seen as opening the flood-gates to pat-
ents on living matter and fostering the then nascent biotechnology
field.12 Subsequent to this important case, major federal legislation
also encouraged commercialization of research. For example,
changed federal rules enabled industry to patent and accordingly
reap commercial rewards from research that was initially based
upon publicly funded projects. 3 In addition, federal legislation spe-
cifically promoting collaboration among government and industry
was also enacted. 74
as stating that "these days, there is very little academic research that doesn't have some
commercial interest, and almost always now the researcher has a potential commercial
interest"); Ronald Kotulak, Playing Doctor... or Playing God? Patents are University's Gold
Mine, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 9, 2001, at C1 (discussing the University of Wisconsin's use of pat-
ents to earn $1.65 billion in licensing and investment revenues since 1927).
71 See e.g., Karen W. Arenson, Columbia Sets Pace in Profiting Off Research, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2,
2000, at B1 (noting Columbia as a particularly aggressive academic institution in deriving
profits from patents); Hall & Scott, supra note 70, at 553. See also Jeff Gottlieb, UCI Case
Raises Issue of Schools' Ties to Business, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 27, 1998, at Al (noting that UC-
Irvine is more dependent than some other institutions on private funds because it only
obtains about half of its research funding from the federal government).
72 See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 308, 318 (1980) (holding that the Patent Act fairly
embraces organisms produced by genetic engineering. See also Krimsky, supra note 1, at
23-25 (describing how Chakabarty allows some biological material to be patented); John M.
Golden, Biotechnology, Technology Policy, and Patentability: Natural Products and Inventions in
the American Patent System, 50 EMORY L. J. 101, 105 (2001) (noting that Chakrabarty, in
combination with the newly created Federal Circuit, helped to foster the development of
pro-biotechnology jurisprudence); Kenneth Sutherlin Dueker, Biobusiness on Campus: Com-
mnercialization of University-Developed Biomedical Technologies, 52 Fooo DRuG L.J. 453, 494
(1997) (discussing Chakrabarty decision and the subsequent growth of biotechnology after
Genentech's initial public offering).
73 Bayh-Dole Act, 35 U.S.C. §§ 200-11 (1994); Steven-Wydler Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 3701-14 (1994);
see also GARY W. MATKIN, TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER AND THE UNIVERSITY 81-94 (1990)
(describing how four specific academic institutions have utilized patents). However,
whether firms will be able to continue to patent the results of research that is partially
funded by the government is uncertain in light of recent public opposition. See, e.g., Peter
Arno & Michael Davis, Paying Twice for the Same Drug, WASH. POST, at A21 (Mar. 27,2002)
(editorial criticizing the government for failing to properly supervise the federal financing
of patented drugs).
74 The Technology Transfer Act allows government researchers to patent their inventions
and also obtain patent-based royalties (up to $150,000). 15 U.S.C. § 3710(c)(a)(3) (1994). In
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2. Patent Impact: Restricted Access
One side effect of the commercialization of biotechnology has
been the increased active enforcement of patents. In particular, both
corporations as well as universities have been more aggressive in
pursuing licensing agreements or suing those who refuse to agree to
license terms.75 Patient advocates assert that licensing fees for the
use of patented diagnostic tests have been priced exorbitantly high,
such that clinics either refuse to offer the test or only offer the test at
prices that far exceed what most consumers can pay.76 This is partic-
ularly true because the demand of licensing fees is often a precursor
or a concomitant threat of litigation for unauthorized use of a
patent7 7
Although restricted access and increased costs are a direct re-
sult of the patents, this result is actually contemplated and en-
couraged by some underlying patent policy principles.
Fundamentally, a patent provides its owner with the legal right to
exclude all others who make, use, or sell the patented invention.7
This fact is supported by theories of patent law that permit the ex-
clusivity of patents as an incentive to create, as well as a means to
recoup development costs.79 In addition, because the time invested
in creating a patentable invention, as well as the time and money
spent procuring a patent is substantial, those that undergo this pro-
cess have a financial incentive to ensure that others are not usurping
their exclusive right to use the patented invention.
addition, the act allows and encourages government researchers to enter into commercial
arrangements with for-profit companies. Id. at §§ 3701-14 (1994) (providing for CRADA).
7 See, e.g., MATan, supra note 73, passim (describing the creation of technology transfer of-
fices at universities after patents became more common); Dueker, supra note 72, at 464-67
(noting the increased patent licensing activity among universities after the enactment of
the Bayh-Dole Act); Kotulak, supra note 70, at C1 (noting the University of Wisconsin's
effective patent licensing program).
76 See, e.g., Tebo, supra note 1, at 50-51 (citing Jeremy Rifkin, who noted that genetic tests
based on non-patented genes cost around $50 while tests based on patented genes can cost
$2500 after licensing fees are considered).
77 See Greenberg, 208 F.Supp. 2d at 921 (noting that patent owner sent "enforcement letters" to
centers offering the patented test for free and also sought to limit the total number of labs
using the patented disease through exclusive licensing agreements; Tebo, supra note 1, at
50-51 (comparing current gene patent enforcement to historical surgical procedure patent
enforcement).
78 See 35 U.S.C. § 271 (1994) (providing that patent owners have the right to exclude all
others from making, using, selling, offering to sell, or importing the patented invention).
,9 See supra notes 10-21 and accompanying text (describing patent law theory that supports
the patent owner right to exclusivity).
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However, although patent laws may contemplate the fact that
patents result in restricted access, there are also health policy argu-
ments for tempering the usual patent laws when they negatively
impact public health.80 In addition, in the case of patents that are
based upon patient contributions, such restricted access ironically
excludes those who helped secure the patent.81 Moreover, patents
based upon patient contributions have a potential negative feedback
cycle that threatens further research and collaboration.8 2 In particu-
lar, patients who believe that they will merely be used as means to
80 See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (1994) (providing limited exception to infringement to enable
acceleration of FDA approval of generic medications); Canada - Patent Protection of Pharma-
ceutical Products (Generic Medicines), Report of the Panel, WT/DS114/R (March 17, 2000),
available at http://www.wto.org/english (considering public health impacts in evaluating
patent rights in an international dispute before an arbitration panel of the World Trade
Organization). The increasing number of patents and patent players has been criticized as
impeding the progress of science in many areas. See also Rebecca Eisenberg, Technology
Transfer and The Genone Project: Problems with Patenting Research Tools, 5 RiSK HEALTH
SAFETY & ENV'T. 163 (1994) (describing limitations to licensing of all patent rights essential
to continue research); Clarisa Long, Proprietary Rights and Why Initial Allocations Matter, 49
EMORY L. J. 823, 827-36 (2000) (describing problems inherent in patent licensing of basic
research, especially transaction costs); see also HUGO Statement on Patenting of DNA Se-
quences (April 2000), at http://www.gene.ucl.ac.uk/hugo/patent2000.html (clarifying op-
position to patenting of genetic components where there is a negative impact on the
further progress of research); Arti K. Rai, The Information Revolution Reaches Pharmaceuti-
cals: Balancing Incentives, Costs, and Access in the Post-Genomics Era, 2001 U. ILL. L. REv. 173,
192-94 (2001) (describing the potential problem of patents on early-stage genomkcs re-
search for later commercialization); Taking License With Your Genes, supra note 1, at C1
(discussing the impact of the increasing gene patents on medical research and health care
costs).
81 For example, the hospital that owned the patent rights related to the gene for Canavan's
disease threatened to sue clinics who provided the test for free and demanded a royalty
payment that would essentially prevent the clinics from continuing to provide a service to
patients. See, e.g., Greenberg, 208 F. Supp.2d at 921; Brower, supra note 59, at 1 (noting that
the Canavan Foundation was blocked from offering free genetic screening after refusing to
pay royalties and follow licensing restrictions by patent owner Miami Children's Hospital
which requested that the tests be limited in number, as well as in location); Gillis, supra
note 52, at A14 (describing different licensing approaches taken by patent owner Miami
Children's Hospital including a failed attempt to exclusively license the patent); Taking
License With Your Genes, supra note 1, at C1 (noting some doctors have stopped offering a
test for Down Syndrome because the patent licensing fees, together with low Medicare
payments, do not make it a viable commercial option); James Meek, Doctors Hindered by
Company's Gene Patent, THE GUARIAN, Feb. 7, 2002, at 8 (noting that doctors' ability to
study haemochromatosis, a disease affecting up to 20,000 Britons, is hindered because the
patent owner on the underlying gene has enforced the patent against laboratories result-
ing in a reduction of testing by about one third).
82 Many patients provide contributions on the assumption that resulting research will be
freely available to all; if patients realize the commercial realities, they may refuse to par-
ticipate. See supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text (noting that patients were shocked to
discover the results of their contributions patented because they had assumed all treat-
ments would be freely available).
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get a patent may refuse to contribute their biological materials, or
may require licensing of their biological materials, which would fur-
ther increase the overall costs of obtaining a patent.8
In addition, although patients and patent owners could theo-
retically "strike a bargain," that has been unlikely because of how
research is currently conducted.84 In particular, researchers often are
obligated to assign any inventions that they discover during the
course of their work to their employer. 5 Accordingly, many of the
scientists who work with patient contributors have little control
over whether a patent is sought and often have already ceded any
ownership interest in patents to their employers. Moreover, the or-
ganization that owns a patent typically views a patent as an income-
generating device, rather than something that would create deep-
seated resentments or have negative impact on further research. In
fact, in the typical situation where a researcher works with patient
contributors but is required to give the corporate employer patent
ownership, the patent owner would have no direct interaction with
the impacted patient population.
Although patient perceptions are not reflected in the current
medico-research reality, a reasoned inquiry into whether patients
are overlooked as potential inventors under patent laws is an irn-
portant question. If patients could be considered patent inventors,
or otherwise gain some control over the patent, some of their nega-
tive perceptions would be allayed, if not alleviated.
III. ADDRESSING THE INVENTORSHIP ISSUE
A. The Importance of Inventorship
1. Inventorship Policy
The significance of inventorship in patent law is underscored
repeatedly in the United States Patent Act. From the first applica-
83 See Fleischer, Seeking Rights to Crucial Gene, supra note 49, at C16 (citing Professor Eisen-
berg for criticizing the PXE approach as potentially hindering research efforts because of
the increasing number of individuals seeking rights).
84 However, this possibility is nonetheless discussed as a possible option. See infra notes 194-
96 and accompanying text (discussing the contractual approach taken by patient group
PXE).
5 See supra note 38 (noting that inventions may be assigned prior to patent grant); see also
supra note 62 and accompanying text (noting that the researcher who worked with patient
contributors in the Canavan case had in fact been required to assign his rights as part of
his employment contract).
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tion for a patent, correct identification of the inventor is under-
scored. Not only must the original inventor(s) request a patent
application, 6 but also the inventor(s) must submit oaths declaring
their belief that they are the first and true inventors.8 7 These proce-
dural rules help ascertain whether the patentability requirement
that the invention is indeed new, rather than derived from another,
is satisfied.88 In addition, the importance of these rules is under-
scored by the fact that improper naming of inventors can result in
invalidation of the patent, i.e., total loss of all patent rights.89
Inventorship is also emphasized by certain unique aspects of
United States patent law that have repeatedly withstood pressure to
comply with a different international norm. The United States is the
only industrialized country to continue to insist that patents be
granted only to those who are first inventors ("first to invent" rule),
as opposed to a rule that rewards those who are first to request a
patent ("first to file" rule).90 The United States' distinct position has
been fairly consistent throughout the history of the Patent Act.91
Congress has rejected proposals to adopt a first to file system thus
- 35 U.S.C. § 111 (1994) (noting that application shall be made, or authorized to be made by
an inventor and include an oath by the inventor).
87 35 U.S.C. § 115 (oath requirement for inventor).
83 See 35 U.S.C. § 102(f).
89 See, e.g., id; see also Jamesbury Corp. v. United States, 518 F.2d 1384, 1395 (1975) (noting
that inclusion of less than all the inventors can make a patent void, if established by clear
and convincing evidence); PerSeptive Biosystems, Inc. v. Pharmacia Biotech, 12 F.
Supp.2d. 69 (D.Mass. 1998) (holding patent unenforceable on grounds of inequitable con-
duct because of failure to name inventors). However, there are procedures that would
typically be applicable to correction of inventorship, including either the issuance of a
certificate of correction or the re-issuance of a patent, depending on a number of other
factors. These factors include whether the inventors agreed to the change as well as
whether there were other errors in the patent. See 35 U.S.C. § 251 (1994); 35 U.S.C. § 255
(listing the requirement for certificate of correction); 35 U.S.C. § 256 (listing the require-
ment for correction of the named inventor); see also Merry Mfg. Co. v. Burns Tool Co., 335
F.2d 239, 242 (5th Cir. 1964).
90 Request for Comments on the International Effort to Harmonize the Substantive Require-
ments of Patent Laws, 66 Fed. Reg. 15409, 15410 (Mar. 19, 2001) (noting current U.S. ad-
herence to the first-to-invent rule in contrast to the remainder of the world); 21st Century
Patent System Improvement Act, Congressional Record - House of Representatives, 105th
Cong., 1st Sess., April 23, 1997, 143 Cong. Rec. H1719-03, at H1727 (clarifying that the
United states is a first to invent, rather than first to file nation); Steal American Technologies
Act, 142 CONG. REC. H6718-02 (daily ed. June 25, 1996) (statement of Rep. Rohrabacher)
(noting that the U.S. is the only country in the world operating under the first-to-invent
system).
91 Beginning with the 1790 Patent Act, the first incarnation of the current Patent Act, there
was consideration and rejection of a first-to-file system in favor of the current system of
rewarding the first true inventor. See, e.g., Edward C. Waltersheid, Priority of Invention:
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far and interested organizations, including independent inventors,
have strongly denounced such proposals as inimical to U.S. patent
policy.92 The United States' resistance to abandoning the first to in-
vent policy is further underscored by the fact that the current sys-
tem actually results in a far more complex process of determining
who is entitled to a patent.93
Although United States patent policy favors the first to invent,
the nomenclature "first to invent" is somewhat of a misnomer since
the system is not one of absolute priority. Rather, priority is tem-
pered by another important social policy underlying the patent sys-
tem; namely, the idea that patents are to be rewarded to those who
first share their inventions with the public such that the greater pub-
lic knowledge is benefited. For example, if an individual is the abso-
lute first to conceive the invention, but keeps it secret from the
public for one hundred years, a later inventor who quickly divulges
the invention will nonetheless be awarded a patent because that sec-
ond inventor was the first to bring an invention to society's knowl-
edge.94 Similarly, even if a first inventor does not keep an invention
secret, but unduly delays between conceiving the invention and re-
How the United States Came to Have a "First-to-Invent" Patent System, 23 AIPLA Q.J. 263, 286-
88 (1995).
92 See, e.g., Edwin A. Suominen, Re-Discovering Article 1, Section 8 - The Formula for First-to-
Invent, J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 641 (2001); Edward G. Fiorito, The "Basic Proposal" for Harmoniza-
tion of U.S and Worldwide Patent Laws Submitted by WIPO, 73 J. PAT. OFF. Sc'y 83 (1991).
However, the United States may eventually succumb to international pressures in the in-
terest of securing an efficient global system of patent filing. See, e.g., Tod Preston, The
World Intellectual Property Organization's Conference on the International Patent System, 3
USPTO ToDAY, at 3, 5 (Mar./Apr. 2002), at http://www.uspto.gov/go/opa/ptotoday/
mar-apr2002.pdf (noting recent consideration of first to file issue); Waltersheid, supra note
91, at 264.
93 See 35 U.S.C. § 102(g) (1994). The complex adjudicatory system for determining the first
inventor is officially called a patent interference in which the PTO determines which of
two entities was the true first inventor. See 35 U.S.C. § 135 (providing for interference
procedure); MPEP, supra note 35, at 2300-1 to 2300-36 (providing information on interfer-
ences for patent examiners).
4 35 U.S.C. § 102 (g) (1994); see also Correge v. Murphy, 705 F.2d 1326, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 1983)
(quoting International Glass v. United States, 408 F.2d 395, 403 (Ct. Cl. 1968) (noting that
"the courts have consistently held that an invention though completed, is deemed aban-
doned, suppressed, or concealed if, within a reasonable time after completion, no steps are
taken to make the invention publicly known. Thus, failure to file a patent application; to
describe the invention in a publicly disseminated document; or to use the invention pub-
licly, have been held to constitute abandonment, suppression, or concealment.")); see also
35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1994) (barring patentability of invention if inventor unduly delays be-
tween publicizing the invention and filing for a patent); LaPorte, Inc. v. Norfolk Dredging
Co., 787 F.2d 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (noting that one of the purposes of 102(b) is to en-
courage early filing).
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ducing it to practice while a second inventor is the first to reduce the
invention to practice, the first inventor can lose the right to the pat-
ent because of the strong policy favoring prompt disclosure of in-
ventions to society.95 Accordingly, the patent rules mediate between
the policy of providing the patent to the first inventor while also
encouraging prompt disclosure of inventions.
96
2. The Implications of Inventorship on Patent Ownership
The importance of inventorship also extends into patent own-
ership. In particular, patent laws reward inventors with presump-
tive ownership of patents on their inventions. The ownership
presumption is crucial because patent ownership conveys the right
to exclude all others from any use of the patented invention without
the owner's consent; accordingly, ownership of a widely utilized in-
vention can be of huge financial importance.97
Patent ownership rules also favor inventors who jointly create
an invention by providing each joint inventor with the same pre-
sumptive right to patent ownership. The Patent Act explicitly pro-
vides that patents have attributes of personal property and that each
joint inventor can license the patented invention without consent or
even accounting to other co-owners.98 Accordingly, being the inven-
tor or even a joint inventor of a patent conveys extensive privileges.
Inventorship is a key issue for patient contributors who seek to
control the results of their contributions. For example, if patient con-
tributors were considered inventors or even joint inventors of pat-
ents under current rules, they could license any entities they
95 See, e.g., W.L. Gore & Assoc. v. Garlock, Inc., 721 F.2d 1540, 1550 (Fed. Cir. 1983); see also 35
U.S.C. § 102(g) (1994).
9 See Checkpoint Sys., 54 F.3d at 761 (noting that one of the purposes of 102(g) is to ensure
that the patent goes to the first inventor while another purpose is to encourage prompt
disclosure of the invention).
J7 See, e.g., Kotulak, supra note 1, at C1 (noting Amgen's estimated $100 million patent); see
also supra note 3 and accompanying text (noting public perception that gene patents are
very valuable)
98 See 35 U.S.C. § 261 (1994) (noting that patents "shall have the attributes of personal prop-
erty."); 35 U.S.C. § 262 (providing that "[iln the absence of any agreement to the contrary,
each of the joint owners of a patent may make, use, offer to sell, or sell the patented inven-
tion within the United States, or import the patented invention into the United States,
without the consent of and without accounting to the other owners.") (emphasis added). How-
ever, there does appear to be some issue as to the whether each co-owner can assign the
patent to others since enforcement of a patent requires joinder of all patent owners. See
Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, Collaborative Research: Conflicts on Authorship, Ownership and Account-
ability, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1161, 1211-12 (2000).
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wished, even over the objections of other joint inventors. In addi-
tion, courts have held that in the case of joint inventors, a complete
defense to one joint inventor's infringement claim is a license by the
other joint inventor.99 Accordingly, if patients were joint inventors,
they could potentially trump the desires of the other joint inventor
to sue for patent infringement or to charge exorbitant license fees.
For example, in the Canavan case, if the contributing patients were
considered joint inventors, they could have provided royalty-free li-
censes to the labs that wished to provide the patented test and
thereby insulate these labs from the prospect of infringement suits
from the other joint inventors. Thus, the power inherent in present
joint inventorship rules could theoretically provide patients with the
very control that they seek in promoting broader access to patented
technology. However, there remains the legal problem that the pre-
sent law makes it difficult for patients to be considered joint inven-
tors. An additional and potentially more critical problem is a
possible change to the legal implications of joint inventorship that
would eliminate the type of control presently available to joint
inventors.
B. Applying Current Law to Patients
1. What is the (Patentable) Invention?
To determine whether patient contributors have a viable claim
to inventorship, it is important first to re-visit what constitutes a
patentable invention. As previously mentioned, the mere idea of a
problem is not sufficient for a patent; a patentable invention is more
complex than merely realizing a problem or observing natural phe-
nomena.1°° However, a simplistic definition of what is patentable is
more elusive without further description of the patent examination
process.
Essentially, a patentable invention is determined based upon
the patent "claims" that conclude the patent application. By defini-
tion, "claims" consist of one or more sentences which define the
scope of the patentable invention for purposes of both patentability
9 See, e.g., Ethicon, Inc. v. Yoon, 64 F.3d 671 (1995); Schering Corp. v. Roussel-UCLAF SA,
104 F.3d 341, 344 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
10o See supra notes 14-17 and accompanying text (explaining basic patentability standards); see
also supra note 63 and accompanying text (explaining why patient contributions constitute
unpatentable material).
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as well as for enforcement of patent rights once a patent issues.10 1
The claims are central to the patentability determination because
they define the invention;10 2 in particular, the PTO compares the
claimed invention with what exists previously (referred to as "prior
art") to determine if the patent application really claims an inven-
tion that satisfies the technical requirements of being new and non-
obvious. 103
2. Who Invented the Claimed Invention?
In addition to the preliminary issue of patentability, claims are
also critical to determining inventorship, which is typically a pre-
liminary basis of patent ownership rights. Accordingly, the claims
of the patent are central to determining the validity of patients'
claims to inventorship. Moreover, there may be multiple inventors
of patent claims, with each joint inventor being entitled to equal
rights.
Before discussing joint inventorship, fundamental components
of invention, as well as individual inventorship will first be dis-
cussed. In particular, invention is divided into the steps of first con-
ceiving the invention ("conception"), followed by reducing the
invention to practice ("reduction to practice").'04 The delineation of
these steps reflects that part of an invention may be primarily
mental, or conceptual, whereas to ensure that an invention functions
101 See, e.g., Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 607 (1950) (a claim
in a patent provides the metes and bounds of the right which the patent confers on the
patentee to exclude others from making, using, or selling the protected invention); Corn-
ing Glass Works v. Sumitomo Elec. U.S.A., Inc., 868 F.2d 1251,1257-58 (Fed. Cir. 1989) ("A
claim in a patent provides the metes and bounds of the right which the patent confers on
the patentee to exclude others from making, using, or selling the protected invention."); In
re Van Geuns, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d 1057, 1185 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (noting that claims define scope of
invention); see also 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1994) (noting that a patent application "shall conclude
with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject mat-
ter which the applicant regards as his invention").
102 However, the claims must also be read in conjunction with the rest of the application
referred to as the "specification." See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1994); Wamer-Jenkinson Co. v.
Hilton Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 29 (1999).
103 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 102-03 (1994); see also supra note 36 (describing PTO prior art search).
104 Typically the conception of an invention will be followed by a "reduction to practice"
which involves making the inventive concept work. Although the two steps are consid-
ered separate, in certain areas, such as biotechnology, courts have found that there must
be simultaneous conception and reduction to practice because the realities of finding chemi-
cal compounds are such that the idea of finding a specific compound may be far removed
from the prospect of actually finding such a compound. See, e.g., Amgen v. Chugai, 927
F.2d 1200, 1206 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
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as intended, there may need to be a working model created, or some
other way to "reduce" the mental conceptions to practice.
a. Conception
Conception is a critical starting point with respect to determin-
ing inventorship issues. In fact, some courts have referred to con-
ception as the "touchstone of invention."'1 5 Conception is defined as
the completion of the mental activity involved in formulating the
invention.10 6 It requires a mental picture of the invention, which is
sufficiently definite that another person with adequate skill in the
area could understand the invention.10 7 Accordingly, conception re-
quires specificity and a particular solution to a problem, rather than
a general goal or research plan.08 As noted by one court, the con-
ception requirement is intended to "ensure that patent rights attach
only when an idea is so far developed that the inventor can point to
a definite, particular invention."'1 9 In the area of biotechnology, con-
ception of a genetic component requires knowledge of a specific
chemical structure."0
b. Can Patients Conceive the Claimed Invention?
Although patients typically do not claim sole inventorship of
patents, looking at whether patients could satisfy this standard is
nonetheless helpful in illustrating a gap between patient perceptions
and patent law with respect to inventorship as a whole. As noted
earlier in this section, the first step to determining proper inventor-
ship is to examine the patent claims. When the steps to determining
inventorship are outlined and applied to patients, it becomes clear
that the patients' perceptions do not match the present patent laws.
In most cases, the actual patent claims do not include any activities
that patients directly performed. For example, patent claims to iso-
lated gene sequences, or methods of detecting diseases based upon
the isolation of gene sequences, typically require knowledge of bio-
115 See, e.g., Burroughs Wellcome v. Barr, 40 F.3d 1223, 1227-28 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
106 Id.
107 See id. at 1228; see also Hybritech, Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d 1367, 1376
(Fed. Cir. 1986) (defining conception as requiring the "formation in the mind of the inven-
tor, of a definite and permanent idea of the complete and operative invention, as it is
hereafter to be applied in practice").
103 Burroughs Wellconie, 40 F.3d at 1228; Sewall v. Walters, 21 F.3d 411, 415 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
109 See, e.g., Burroughs Wellcoine, 40 F.3d at 1228.
110 See, e.g., id. at 1229; Amigen, 927 F.2d at 1206.
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logical sciences beyond the realm of most patients. In addition, al-
though patients may perceive their efforts to have substantially
advanced ultimate accomplishments, the definition of conception
does not extend to those who assist; rather, conception of the inven-
tion requires an actual mental picture of the claimed invention. A
patient who presents the raw material that a researcher can examine
and use to isolate a patented gene is not presenting anything that
can be claimed because her own genetic material, in its natural state,
fails to satisfy the patent law requirement of novelty."' Moreover,
such a patient would fail to satisfy the requirement for conception of
the chemical components of the isolated genetic material, unless the
patient happened to be a genetic research scientist herself. In most
cases, however, the patient's contribution is more analogous to a
general research plan or goal that courts have dismissed as unpat-
entable for failing to have the requisite specificity to constitute a so-
lution to a problem." 2
One illustration of the distinction between patient contribution
and patentable invention lies in the legendary case of Moore v. Re-
gents of the University of California, in which the surreptitious scien-
tists who removed Mooore's spleen and other bodily fluids" 3
applied for and received a patent that claimed a cell line derived
from Moore's spleen cells. The patent itself claimed a cell line of T-
lymphocytes that are not naturally occurring, as well as methods of
using the cell line to produce lymphokines." 4 Although scientists
created the cell-line based upon patient Moore's actual cell, the
claim to the artificially created cell line was not a function of
Moore's own mental conception. In addition, the claimed invention
did not claim Moore's cell, nor could it, because discoveries of natu-
rally existing compounds are not patentable; among other things,
naturally occurring compounds would fail to meet patent law's
novelty requirement."5 Accordingly, a claim by Moore to have ei-
M See, e.g., supra notes 23-26 and accompanying text (noting that natural discoveries are not
patentable, although modified genetic material, such as isolated gene sequences, are
patentable).
112 See Sewall, 21 F.3d at 415.
113 Over a period of months, Moore contributed blood, skin, bone marrow aspirate, as well as
sperm. See Moore, 51 Cal. 3d at 126.
114 See id. at 127.
115 See, e.g., Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 128-30 (holding that
patents cannot issue for the discovery of phenomena of nature); In re Bergy, 563 F.2d 1031
(C.C.P.A. 1977).
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ther invented the claimed invention, or to have a patentable inven-
tion in his own cells, would fail.
A more recent case, Greenberg v. Miami Children's Hospital, also
provides a good illustration of patient contributions that assist, but
do not invent a patentable compound." 6 In this case, parents of chil-
dren afflicted with Canavan's disease provided biological material
and financial support to a doctor." 7 Although the doctor ultimately
was successful in isolating the gene responsible for the disease, the
patent that was applied for and granted to the doctor's employer,
the Miami Children's Hospital Research Institute, prevented the
free testing that the patients had envisioned." 8 Although the pa-
tients sued on a number of legal grounds, including breach of con-
tract and lack of informed consent, they notably did not include a
claim regarding inventorship of the patent."9 Although they en-
gaged in more activities than patient Moore, they would still fail to
meet the inventorship requirement. For example, many of the patent
claims refer to "an isolated nucleic acid molecule" having certain
specific sequences, which the patients would not have participated
in creating since only the doctor isolated the specific material. 120
None of the patent claims refer to the raw material from which the
doctor determined the isolated material.' 2' Moreover, as in Moore,
claims to natural compounds would not be patentable because natu-
ral discoveries cannot satisfy the novelty requirement. 22
3. Are There Joint Inventors?
Although patients alone are unlikely to be considered sole in-
ventors, the patent law also provides for joint inventorship. In gen-
eral, joint inventors must have jointly created the patentable
invention. In particular, the statutory definition of joint inventors
states that inventors may be joint "even though (1) they did not
physically work together or at the same time, (2) each did not make
116 See Greenberg, 208 F. Supp.2d at 918.
17 Id. at 921.
118 Id. (noting that the plaintiffs were never informed that the hospital intended to seek a
patent).
119 See id. at 921-22 (listing the plaintiffs' allegations).
120 See Matalon et al., Aspartoacylase Gene, Protein and Methods of Screening for Mutations
Associated with Canavan Disease, U.S. Patent No. 5,679,635 (Oct. 21, 1997).
12 1 See generally id. (containing no claims to raw material).
122 See supra note 115 and accompanying text (explaining that phenomena of nature, even if
unusual, are not patentable).
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the same type or amount of contribution, or (3) each did not make a
contribution to the subject matter of every claim of the patent."123
However, case law has imposed additional requirements, such as
the requirement that co-inventors collaborate in the conception of
the invention, as the following section will explain.124
a. Conception Requirements for Co-Inventors
A pertinent case to illustrate the requirement of joint collabora-
tion in conception for co-inventors is the Burroughs Wellcome case, in
which scientists from the National Institutes of Health (NIH) unsuc-
cessfully tried to claim co-inventorship of the AZT compound, as
well as a method of using it to treat AIDS.125 Burroughs Wellcome
and NIH scientists, were simultaneously pursuing an HIV cure us-
ing different approaches. 126 Burroughs Wellcome's original research
goal of finding a method to treat AIDS would have failed to meet
the required specificity for conception. 27 However, by the time that
the Burroughs Wellcome scientists applied for a patent on the com-
pound AZT, claiming utility against HIV, they had more than a gen-
eral hope. Their patent application could confer the knowledge
about AZT to anyone with sufficient expertise in the area - accord-
ingly, they had conceived and formulated the idea that AZT had
activity that appeared to be useful in treating HIV.12'
NIH scientists claimed that they should be entitled to joint in-
ventorship status because they had confirmed that AZT was active
against HIV in humans, using their live human cell line. 29 However,
the court found that the invention of using AZT to treat AIDS was
already conceived by Burroughs Wellcome before the NIH confirma-
1- 35 U.S.C. § 116 (2001).
124 See, e.g., Burroughs Wellcorne, 40 F.3d at 1229-30.
125 Id. at 1228.
126 Id. at 1225 (stating Burroughs Wellcome utilized mouse retroviruses, while NIH used a
live human cell line).
127 Id. at 1229.
128 Id. (noting that Burroughs Welcome had "thought of the particular antiviral agent with
which they intended to address the HIV treatment problem" and formulated the idea of
the invention to the point that they could express it clearly in the form of a draft patent
application").
129 The two organizations collaborated on one level: the NIH sought compounds from phar-
maceutical companies, including Burroughs Wellcome, to screen, using a unique live HIV
virus. Burroughs Wellconte, 40 F.3d at 1225. Before the patent application decision, Bur-
roughs Wellcome had sent a sample of AZT to NIH laboratories for testing with the live
human cell line, although the sample was not identified. Id. at 1226.
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tion130 In particular, the court noted that the patent application draft
"shows that the idea was dearly defined in the inventors' minds; all
that remained was to reduce it to practice - to confirm its oper-
ability and bring it to market."' 3'
In addition, assistance towards a patentable invention in the
form of general ideas and information does not give rise to joint
inventorship because of the lack of participation in the conception of
the invention. For example, one who merely provided ideas and in-
formation on what was currently available on the market was held
not to be a joint inventor of a device which did not use any such
information. 32 Similarly, one who made suggestions for potential
material to be used in the creation of a balloon angioplasty catheter
was deemed to be "no more than a skilled salesman," and accord-
ingly, not a joint inventor of a patent on the catheter.133
b. Can Patients Count as Joint Inventors?
The critical question for many patient contributors is whether
they can be joint inventors, such that they can obtain control over
the patent. However, as this section will show, the suggestion that
patients have contributed significantly enough to be rewarded with
joint inventorship lacks substantial basis within the actual law. This
section will first consider the argument that present law can em-
brace patients within the definition of joint inventorship. However,
this argument ultimately fails because it overlooks the previously
described requirements of conception. In addition, this section will
discuss specific cases in which courts have addressed the issue of
whether patient contributors constitute joint inventors; however,
this section reveals that none of the case law thus far supports pa-
tients' claims. Accordingly, the final section looks to analogous
claims of joint inventorship based on causation to see if a similar
legal theory can assist the patients' claim. However, this section ulti-
mately concludes that there is no present case law that supports an
inclusion of patient contributors within the current definition of
joint inventorship.
130 Id. at 1230.
131 Id. (citing Haskett v. Colebourne, 671 F.2d 1362, 1365-66 (C.C.P.A. 1982) for the proposi-
tion that enabling patent applications can corroborate conception).
13 Pro-Mold and Tool Co., Inc., v. Great Lakes Plastics, Inc., 75 F.3d 1568, 1575-76 (Fed. Cir.
1996).
133 Hess v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc., 106 F.3d 976, 981 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
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i. Actual Patient Contributor Cases
There are only three published opinions involving the issue of
whether patient contributors can be co-inventors, all arising from
the same set of facts.134 In the first two cases, the defendant Synbiot-
ics Corporation raised the inventorship issue as a defense to patent
infringement. 135 In the third case, Brown v. Regents of the University of
California, the patient initiated an action to correct inventorship of
the patent to include herself.136 Although the courts in each of these
cases found against the patient contributor, the specific rationales
help explain the current problem of with including patient contribu-
tors as joint inventors.
In Synbiotics I, the opinion addressed a host of procedural is-
sues, with the court opining on the inventorship issue as merely one
of several invalidity defenses alleged against the plaintiff's motion
for a preliminary injunction.137 The inventorship issue was not cen-
tral to the court's ultimate denial of the plaintiff's preliminary in-
junction motion and appeared to have been ill-framed as a
defense.1 38 In addition, the court's opinion on the inventorship issue
may have been colored by its negative perception of the defendant's
other claims.139 However, the court's approach to the inventorship
issue in Synbiotics I is nonetheless important because of its impact
on subsequent cases.
The inventorship argument presented in Synbiotics I was
whether patient contributor Marlo Brown was a co-discoverer of the
134 Although there is an additional opinion involving one of the same patents, the issue of
inventorship based on patient contribution was not considered. See Regents of University
of California v. Hansen, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d 1473,1484 n.9 (S.D. Cal. 1994) (noting the additional
argument that the patent should be suspect for failure to give inventorship credit to Marlo
Brown "has been litigated in other cases and the court does not address this irrelevant
issue here").
135 See Univ. of Cal. v. Synbiotics Corp., 29 U.S.P.Q.2d 1463, 1466-67 (S.D. Calif. 1993) [Synbiot-
ics I]; Regents of Univ. of California v. Synbiotics Corp., 849 F. Supp. 740, 741 (S.D. Calif.
1994) [Synbiotics II].
136 Brown v. Regents of Univ. of California, 866 F. Supp. 439 (N.D. Cal. 1994).
137 Synbiotics claimed, among several other defenses to patent infringement, that the patent
was invalid for failure to include patient Marlo Brown as a joint inventory. Synbiotics 1, 29
U.S.P.Q.2d at 1466-67. Synbiotics also made the more traditional argument that the pat-
ented invention was invalid on grounds of obviousness or in the alternative, unenforce-
able. Id. The procedural context of this case is actually fairly complex - the failure to join
an inventor defense, was merely one of four defenses against the patents' validity or en-
forcement to oppose a preliminary injunction motion; in addition, the opinion considered
an appeal from the magistrate judge's order over discovery disputes. Id. at 1463-44.
3 Id.
139 See, e.g., id. at 1465 (characterizing the defendant's claims as constituting "delay tactics").
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FIV virus that was used to develop patented diagnostic methods for
FIV.140 However, the patent in question did not claim the FIV virus,
but rather, a method for diagnosing the virus.'4 ' Accordingly, it is not
surprising that the court summarily dismissed the argument that
Brown's contribution of observing that her cats had human AIDS-
like symptoms and bringing them to researchers for study failed to
qualify her as a joint inventor of the claimed invention. 42 Rather, the
court analogized Brown's contribution to suggesting an idea for a
desired result, rather than a specific method, which has been previ-
ously held to be inadequate for joint inventorship.'4 The court
noted that conception required the idea of the invention's structure,
as well as an operable method of making it.144 Moreover, the court
suggested that in this case, conception might not have been able to
be established until the invention was actually reduced to practice
long after Brown's contribution. 45 The court clarified that:
[a]t most Brown suggested that her cats showed symptoms of an
immunosuppressive disease and provided... the infected cats. On
the other hand, [the named inventors'] discovery included the
identification of a complete and operative method for isolating the
new virus, actually isolating the new virus, and a complete and op-
erative method for diagnosing cats that are infected with FIV virus.
Brown can hardly be deemed a co-inventor or discoverer. 146
140 Id. at 1466. The court noted that "Synbiotics attacks the validity and enforceability of the
* . .patent on four grounds: 1) the [platentability ... is based solely on the non-obvi-
ousness of the discovery of the FIV virus. Consequently,... the role of Marlo Brown in
the discovery of the FIV virus is crucial to the determination of the validity and enforce-
ability of the... patent; 2) Marlo Brown was a co-discoverer of the FIV virus .. " Id.
141 Neils Peders and Janet Yamamoto, Feline T-Lymphotropic Lentivirus Assay, U.S. Patent
No. 5,118,602 (June 2,1992) (claiming a "method for diagnosing viral infection in a suscep-
tible host, said method comprising: obtaining a physiological specimen from said host;
and determining the presence of feline T-lymphotropic virus (FrLV) or antibodies to FTLV
in a physiological specimen from said host").
14 2 See Synbiotics 1, 29 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1466 (characterizing the allegation of joint inventorship as
'Tmeritless").
1 Id. at 1467 (citing Garrett Corp v. United States, 422 F.2d 874, 881 (Ct. Cl. 1970) and Amgen
v. Chugai Pharmaceutical Co., 9237 F.2d 1200, 1206 (Fed. Cir. 1991)).
144 Id.
14s Id. (relying heavily on Amgen v. Chugai for the idea that this invention required simulta-
neous conception and reduction to practice). However, even if only conception were re-
quired, Brown would likely still have difficulty meeting this test because her idea of a
problem did not include knowledge of the chemical structure of the compound, let alone a
method for detecting the virus as was required by the claims.
HeinOnline  -- 2 Hous. J. Health L. & Pol'y 141 2002
Hous. J. HEALTH L. & POL'Y
In the second case, Synbiotics II, the inventorship issue was
central to the opinion.147 In particular, the plaintiffs moved for par-
tial summary judgment that Marlo Brown was not a co-inventor of
the patent-in-suit, as well as on some propositions of law that
flowed from that presumption.148 The court considered the inventor-
ship issue more thoroughly than it did in Synbiotics I, but ultimately
came to the same conclusion, based upon essentially the same prin-
ciples. 149 In particular, Synbiotics II found that in the case of patents
on genes or chemicals, the law required simultaneous conception
and reduction to practice.150 Patient contributor Brown's status as a
non-scientist effectively excluded her from inventorship under this
definition because the reduction to practice of the relevant genes re-
quired skills beyond her expertise. The court noted that:
Brown admits in her deposition that she made no contribution to
the isolation of the virus or to the determination of its structure,
name, or chemical or physical properties. In essence, Brown's sole
contribution to the discovery of FIV is that she brought her sick
cats, along with her written observations of the cats' symptoms to
UC Davis with a suspicion that the cats may have a virus similar to
the human AIDS virus. These facts do not support a claim that
Brown is a co-inventor .... 151
In the subsequent case, Brown v. Regents of the University of Cali-
fornia, the patient contributor Marlo Brown directly asserted a claim
of co-inventorship in an action to correct the patent inventorship 5 2
Although the Brown case was before a different court than the Synbi-
otics cases and purported to address the issue "anew,"' s3 its ultimate
conclusion was strikingly similar.1 4 In particular, after affirming the
147 The opinion addressed the issue of whether the defendant Synbiotics could amend its
answer to add the affirmative defense of license, in addition to the partial summary judg-
ment issues. See Synbiotics II, 849 F. Supp. at 741.
148 In particular, the court considered whether one who is not a co-inventor, such as Brown
could validly confer a patent license. See Id.
149 Id. at 742.
150 In particular, the court accepted the proposition suggested by plaintiffs that "discovery of
the FIV virus... is similar to the discovery of a gene or chemical compound.... Accord-
ingly, the Court holds that conception, in this case, did not occur until the virus was iso-
lated, or the concept was reduced to practice." Id.
151 Id. (emphasis added).
152 Brown, 866 F. Supp. at 439.
153 Id. at 441 n.3 (clarifying that the court could not merely follow the prior rulings in the
Synbiotics cases because Ms. Brown was not a party to the prior actions and accordingly
could not be bound to the holdings in those cases as a matter of law).
154 Synbiotics I and II were opinions of the Southern District of California, while Brown was an
opinion of the Northern District of California. Although the Synbiotics cases were not le-
gally binding, because both courts were district courts within the same circuit, the Synbiot-
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fact that the principle of simultaneous conception and reduction to
practice should apply in this case, the court concluded that Brown
"at most played a substantial role in the discovery of FIV," but dis-
counted Brown's role for patent purposes. 55 In particular, the court
noted that because the patents do not only claim discovery of the
FIV virus, but claim "isolation and substantial purification of the
virus, as well as methods for diagnosing the virus by detecting the
presence of the virus itself .... ,,156 In addition, although the court
acknowledged Brown's "substantial role" in discovering the FIV vi-
rus, the court characterized Brown's role in the patented product as
minimal; in the court's own words: "Ms. Brown is a non-scientist
who played no role in the laboratory work involved in isolating the
virus; therefore, regardless of the value of her research leads, she cannot
be deemed to have contributed to the conception of the inventions covered
by the patents."'15 7
ii. Analogous Cases Based Upon Causation Theories
Although cases are limited on the issue of patient contributors'
status as inventors, there are nonetheless analogous cases pertinent
to the issue. In particular, patient contributors have claimed that
they were the factor that led to the patented invention, or that the
invention could not have been made but for their contribution. 58 In
other words, the patient contributor cases can be analogized to in-
ventorship cases premised on a causation theory.
The most analogous causation case is Boehringer v. Schering-
Plough, in which the court rejected a defense of patent invalidation
based on failure to join all inventors.' 9 The patent in this case
claimed a method of growing and isolating a specific pig virus,
which the plaintiff claimed was instrumental in developing a vac-
cine for the pig virus.160 As in Synbiotics I, the joint inventorship
ics cases would at least have been persuasive authority to the Brown court as a sister
district court.
155 Brown, 866 F. Supp. at 445.
16 See id.
157Id. (emphasis added).
'
56 See supra note 68 and accompanying text (noting patient's claim that he was essential to
the patentable invention because of his own idea that his immune system was unique).
's9 Boehringer v. Schering-Plough Corp., 984 F. Supp. 239 (D.N.J. 1997).
160 Id. at 244; see also U.S. Patent No. 5,476,778 (issued Dec. 19, 1995) (claiming "[a] method of
growing and isolating swine infertility and respiratory syndrome virus, ATCC-VR2332,
which comprises inoculating the virus on a full or partial sheet of simian cells in the pres-
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claim arose in the context of a defense against infringement. 61 In
particular, the defense argued that the claimed isolation was a col-
laborative effort, and that but for the fact that the alleged co-inven-
tors had provided the inoculum containing the virus, the named
patent inventor would never have been able to inoculate the virus.162
The court rejected the inventorship claim, although it agreed with
what had been provided:
[t]he court agrees that had Collins and Benfield not provided Har-
ris with the inoculum containing the virus, they would not have
been able to isolate the virus, but that does not mean that they
should be entitled to joint inventorship rights. Harris might have
obtained necessary material from Collins and Benfield, but the pat-
ent does not claim a compound. It claims a method developed ex-
clusively by Harris. 63
The damning fact in this court's analysis of the situation is not
that the patent claimed a method, but that what was claimed was
distinct from what was contributed.164 In this sense, the case is very
analogous to that of patients who contribute material that leads to
the discovery of a patentable compound, but do not contribute to
the claimed isolated compound itself. In both instances, the concep-
tion of the claimed invention relates to matter that is performed ex-
clusively by the named inventor after the contribution.
Another analogous case is Buildex, Inc. v. Kason Industries, Inc.,
in which inventorship once again arose as a defense to patent in-
fringement.165 In Buildex, the disputed issue was whether an indi-
vidual who recognized a problem could be considered a joint
ence of serum in a suitable growth medium and incubating the inoculated cell sheet at
about 34 degrees C. to 37 degrees C. until CPE is observed.").
161 See Boehringer, 984 F. Supp. at 259. In particular, the opinion disposed of a motion for a
preliminary injunction and a substantial part of the opinion dealt with other issues, includ-
ing claim construction and invalidity based on nonobviousness. In fact, obviousness was
deemed the "most compelling challenge" to the patent's validity by the court. Id. at 253.
Moreover, the co-inventorship claim is discussed subsequent to the obviousness discus-
sion under the catchall heading of "Other Validity Arguments." Id. at 259.
162 Id. at 260. Although it is possible to argue that the Boehringer did not precisely foreclose
the theory of a causation theory of co-inventorship, the court's handy dismissal of the
claim is nonetheless pertinent to the discussion of whether patient contributors have any
claim that would likely survive. For example, although the court notes that its decision on
the issue of inventorship will not impact the ultimate decision relating to a motion for
preliminary judgment, the court nonetheless described the co-inventorship claim to "lack
substantial merit" and to be "unavailing" as a defense. Boehringer, 984 F. Supp. at 259.
163Id.
164 It is noted that the opinion focused on the fact that the patent claimed a method, not a
compound, but the more important point is that the contributors could not have contrib-
uted to a patentable compound. See id.
165 Buildex, Inc. v. Kason Indus., Inc., 665 F. Supp. 1021, 1024-25 (E.D.N.Y. 1987).
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inventor. The patent in the case related to a hinge-activated switch
assembly and the alleged co-inventor was the first to recognize a
problem with prior switches. 166 However, although both parties ac-
knowledged that they "would not have solved the... problem if
[the allegedly omitted inventor] had not raised the problem first,
this scenario is still consistent with the notion that [the named in-
ventor] was the real inventor. It is one thing to suggest a better
mousetrap ought to be built, it is another thing to build it."'167 None-
theless, the fact that the court so easily dismissed this issue without
even considering joint inventorship status suggests that individuals
who suggest ideas of a desirable invention, rather than a complete
conception of the actual patented invention, will find a cold recep-
tion before the courts.
IV. ADDRESSING THE PATIENT-PATENT INTERPLAY
A. Should Joint Inventorship Be Extended?
1. Re-Considering Joint Inventorship Cases
Although the actual and analogous cases of joint inventorship
regarding patient contributors have not established any legal rights
for such contributors, it is possible that these cases should be
viewed through the more narrow procedural context in which they
were raised, rather than as whole-sale dismissals of the possibility
of including patients within the definition of joint inventors. Admit-
tedly, the ability of patients to establish joint conception of genetic
sequences is difficult. However, it should nonetheless be noted that
in each of the litigated cases where joint inventorship has been an
issue, it was raised under procedural burdens that substantially re-
duced its likelihood of success. In particular, there is always a pre-
sumption that the named inventor of a patent is the only true
inventor - a presumption that can only be overcome by clear and
convincing proof.168 Moreover, in Synbiotics I, the first published
opinion concerning patient contributors, the court may have been
negatively pre-disposed on the issue of inventorship because the
court perceived the party to be engaging in delay tactics, rather than
166 See, e.g., Hess v. Advanced Cardiovascular, 106 F.3d 976, 980 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (noting that
the allegation of inventorship must be established by clear and convincing proof).
167 Buildex, 665 F. Supp. at 1025.
'16 See, e.g., id.
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legitimate defenses.169 This case, in turn, may have been interpreted
over broadly to exclude patient contributors from the definition of
inventors, without accounting for the unique procedural context of
Synbiotics I.
Although there is no clear legal precedent for considering pa-
tients to be joint inventors, one case, albeit in a dissent, has in fact
suggested that joint inventorship should be interpreted to embrace
this scenario. In addressing the removal of cells from patient Moore,
Judge Mosk argued that the spirit of the joint inventorship law
should embrace patients such as Moore, regardless of whether they
were within the literal bounds of the inventorship statute.7 0 Mosk
argued that "the joint invention provision guarantees that all who
contribute in a substantial way to a product's development benefit
from the reward that the product brings."'171 However, even he
probably realized that this was an overstatement of the actual in-
ventorship laws, as he conceded that the patented cell line was pri-
marily the product of the named inventors' efforts.172 Nonetheless,
he argued that "no one can question Moir6's crucial contribution to
the invention; but for the cells of Moir6's body.., there would have
been no [patented] cell line."'173 Moreover, Mosk noted that although
patient contributors do not further the development of the product
in any intellectual or conceptual sense, "what the patients did do,
knowingly or unknowingly, is collaborate with the researchers by
donating their body tissue. By providing the researchers with
unique raw materials, without which the resulting product could
not exist, the donors become necessary contributors to the
product."174
Judge Mosk's language is powerful and persuasive, but is not
anchored within the present joint inventorship law. In particular,
169 See supra notes 138-39 and accompanying text (noting that inventorship issue was weakly
framed). Similarly, the analogous cases based upon causation should also be considered
within their procedural context. For example, the Boehringer case decided the issue of in-
ventorship on a motion for preliminary injunction; in addition, the issue was couched in
the context of whether the patent should be invalidated for misdesignation of the inventor
with purposely deceptive intent. Boehringer, 984 F. Supp. at 259-60.
170 Moore v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 51 Cal.3d 120, 168-69 (Cal. 1990) (Mosk, J., dissenting)
(acknowledging that "strictly speaking" patients would not fall within the bounds of the
law, but that the "spirit" of the law should suffice).
171 Id. at 169 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
172 Id. at 168.
173 Id.
174 Id. at 169 (quoting Danforth, supra note 9, at 197).
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his comments overlook the fact that inventorship is a function of the
claimed invention, which is often quite distinct from what patients
contribute. Judge Mosk's description of patients contributing to the
end product is more analogous to assistance that courts have found
to lack a sufficient link to the conception of the invention itself.175 To
give patients inventorship status based solely upon their contribu-
tion of starting materials would require a phenomenal change in the
law to overcome the requirement that joint inventors jointly conceive
of the actual invention itself. Accordingly, while Judge Mosk pro-
vides good rhetoric, there remains a large gap between his reason-
ing and the reality of the present laws.
2. Commercial Research Realities
Although Judge Mosk's arguments do not reflect present law,
they are nonetheless useful for considering whether patent policy
should consider patients as joint inventors. In particular, the patent
system is intended to foster innovation.176 Patient contributors cur-
rently foster innovation in areas that are low priorities for research
companies who typically devote more resources to projects with
large commercial impact. 77 Patient contributors typically suffer
from diseases that impact limited populations and accordingly are
17 See supra note 140-57 and accompanying text (describing the Marlo Brown case).
176 See supra notes 10-13 and accompanying text (describing goals of the patent system).
177 Rather, most companies direct research towards diseases that affect large populations, and
hence large potential profits. See, e.g., Robert A. Bohrer & John T. Prince, A Tale of Two
Proteins, 12 HARv. J. L. & TECH. 365,366-67 (1999); Steven R. Salbu, AIDS and Drug Pricing:
In Search of a Policy, 71 WASH. U. L. Q. 691, 703 (1993). Although there is a mechanism
outside the patent laws that theoretically could encourage companies to research areas
that impact limited populations, the fact that no research was occurring in areas that pa-
tient contributors desired underscores the failure of present laws to provide adequate in-
centives to encourage such research. See generally David Duffield Rohde, The Orphan Drug
Act: An Engine of Innovation? At What Cost, 55 Food & DRUG L. J. 125, 126-31 (2000)
(describing the impetus behind Congressional enactment of the Orphan Drug Act to pro-
vide economic incentive for the pharmaceutical industry to invest in research and devel-
opment of drugs for rare diseases that otherwise would not allow for recovery of research
costs, let alone profits); see also Pub. L. No. 97-414, 96 Stat. 2049 (1983), codified as
amended at 21 U.S.C. § 360 (1988) (providing patent-like benefits for research that will
impact small populations). Moreover, the Orphan Drug Act itself has been criticized, in-
cluding the fact that it over-compensates some companies. See supra Rohde, at 133-39;
Bohrer & Prince, supra at 382-83; Janice Hogan, Revamping the Orphan Drug Act: Potential
Impact on the World Pharmaceutical Market, 26 L. & POL'Y IN'L Bus. 523, 530-34. (1995).
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less likely to be studied.178 In fact, some patients must solicit and
finance researchers to analyze their biological material.179
There is some recent precedent for amending the joint in-
ventorship requirements to adjust patent incentives. However, the
patient contributor concerns are substantially different than those
that animated the recent amendment. In particular, the joint in-
ventorship and obviousness sections of the Patent Act were previ-
ously amended to prevent unnecessary invalidation of patents, as
well as to ensure that patents would provide an incentive to collabo-
rate. 80 However, an amendment to include patients as inventors
would likely be highly controversial. In particular, any amendment
to provide rights for patients would be creating rights for more par-
ties, rather than cementing the rights of the existing status quo. Ma-
jor companies had nothing to lose from the former amendment and
plenty to gain; in particular, the change reduced the danger of los-
ing patent protection because of diffuse working arrangements
within large companies. Moreover, because most companies require
employees to assign their rights to inventions, the amended patent
laws yielded a bigger patent pot of gold for many large companies.
In addition, whereas many companies helped to usher the last
amendment of joint inventorship into law, those companies would
likely oppose any additional amendment to include patient contrib-
utors, because this would require sharing the pot of gold.
3. A Potential Shift in the Law
In addition, amending joint inventorship to include patients
may be a dubious proposition because of a potential change in the
implications of joint inventorship. In particular, the recent case of
178For example, Canavan disease is a rare genetic disorder that almost exclusively strikes
Ashkenazi Jews. See, e.g., Kolata, supra note 59, at A17. Similarly, PXE is a rare genetic
disease. See Fleisher, Patent Thyself, supra note 57, at 84.
17 See supra notes 44-49 and accompanying text (discussing patients who spear headed re-
search efforts or solicited and financially funded research).
180 See, e.g., Dreyfuss, supra note 98, at 1180 (describing amendment to joint inventorship law).
Among other things, the Patent Act changed the definition of inventorship to clarify and
further define 'Joint inventors" who can now qualify to jointly own a patent even if they
did not work together physically, or even make the same type of contribution to the pat-
ent. See 35 U.S.C. § 116 (2001). At the same time, Congress also altered the standard of
obviousness to allow for serial collaboration within the same organization, such that dif-
ferent working groups would not thwart patentability of a later group when there was
common ownership of a patent. See Patent Law Amendments Act of 1984, 35 U.S.C. § 103
(1994); see also W. Fritz Fasse, The Muddy Metaphysics of Joint Inventorship: Cleaning up After
the 1984 Aniendments to 35 U.S.C. § 116, 5 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 153, 167-72 (1992).
HeinOnline  -- 2 Hous. J. Health L. & Pol'y 148 2002
Ethicon v. Yoon addressed the issue of whether equivalent rights for
all joint inventors is proper in cases where inventors provided dif-
fering degrees of contribution.'8 ' Although the Ethicon majority held
that a joint inventor of only a minority of patent claims may none-
theless license the entire patent, a strong dissent by Judge Newman
questions whether this proposition will continue to hold.82 This
case is particularly relevant to patient contributors, who are unlikely
to have contributed equally to all parts of the claimed invention. In
particular, the differing opinions in Ethicon suggest that the full
ownership rights traditionally accompanying joint inventorship
may no longer continue to exist. To better understand the potential
implications of such a shift in the law for patient contributors, the
dichotomy of views in the Ethicon case will be further elaborated.
a. The Traditional View: Ethicon Majority Opinion
The majority opinion in Ethicon assumed that Congress's
amendment to the joint inventorship requirements, without a con-
comitant change to the rules of joint ownership, must dictate that
Congress did not intend to alter the ownership rules. In particular,
the majority suggested that property rights, including ownership,
should continue to be based on entire patents rather than claims,
even if the amended inventorship rules allow joint inventors to in-
vent only one claim of a patent.183 In addition, the majority noted
that because the un-amended ownership provision refers to joint
owners of a patent, rather than joint owners of a claim, a joint inven-
tor to only one claim should enjoy a "presumption of ownership in
the entire patent."'184 The court explicitly spelled out the logical ex-
tension of this assumption - namely, that the "co-inventor of only
one claim might gain entitlement to ownership of a patent with doz-
ens of claims" without an express agreement to the contrary.'85 The
181 Ethicon v. Yoon, 135 F.3d 1456 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
182 Panel decisions, such as Ethicon remain binding precedent on future cases, although they
may be overturned by the court en banc. See UMC Elecs. Co. v. United States, 816 F.2d 647,
652 n.6 (Fed. Cir. 1987). Usually, the Federal Circuit only hears cases en banc when there
are divergent panel decisions. In the case of joint inventorship and its impact on patent
ownership, there is no present sign of an en banc ruling. However, the lack of uniformity
among Ethicon nonetheless is noteworthy in considering whether joint inventorship is the
appropriate concept to strive for, if there is a possibility that current rules will be reversed.
183 Id. at 1465.
184 Id. at 1466.
18 This single statement that implies potential inequity is the extent of the majority's discus-
sion of equitable issues; the majority did not appear to feel that equity warranted further
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majority's literal interpretation left no room to consider whether the
traditional rule that joint inventors own equal shares of the patent as
tenants-in-common was still applicable because it was developed
during an era where joint inventors by definition jointly contributed
in equal parts to the invention186
b. Challenging Tradition: Judge Newman's Dissent
Contrary to the majority opinion, Judge Newman declared that
"[n]either the law of joint invention nor the law of property so re-
quires" that joint inventorship be identical to joint ownership.18 7
Rather, she noted that the result of the majority's reliance on the
present statutory language produced such inequitable results that
looking beyond the literal language was justified. In Judge New-
man's view, the 1984 amendments "simply permitted persons to be
named on the patent document" as co-inventors to prevent invalida-
tion of the patent (for failure to name all inventors), but had no
bearing on the previous law of ownership that only made those who
conceived of the entire invention owners.1 8 She explained that the
amendment was a technical amendment to account for a changing
commercial reality in which team research efforts resulted in multi-
ple contributors of an invention who did not necessarily satisfy the
joint conception requirement.189 In addition, she noted that the
amendment was intended to avoid complex filing of many separate
applications to account for separately conceived inventions; moreo-
ver, she explained that the amendment avoided the ultimate prob-
lem of patent invalidation for failure to name all inventors who
contributed to all of the claims.190
discussion, or even a more in-depth look at legislative intent behind the inventorship
amendment. Id.
18 Previously, the statute had required that "when an invention is made by two or more
persons jointly, they shall apply for patent jointly." Kimberly-Clark v. Proctor & Gamble,
973 F.2d 915 (Fed. Cir. 1992). In addition, this had been interpreted by courts to require
joint collaboration of the invention by two or more people. Id. (citing Shields v. Hallibur-
ton, 667 F2d 1232, 1236-37; Monsanto v. Kamp, 269 F. Supp. 818, 824 (D.D.C. 1967)).
187 Ethicon, 135 F.3d at 1468 (Newman, J., dissenting).
183 She noted that allowing the naming of additional persons as co-inventors under the
amended statute does not "automatically endow" such persons with "ffull and common
ownership of the entire invention .... That is not a reasonable consequence of the change
in the law of naming inventors .... Id. at 1469 (Newman, J., dissenting).
189 Id. at 1469-70 (Newman, J., dissenting) (emphasis added ).
190 Id. (Newman, J., dissenting) (citing numerous cases where patents were invalidated for
failure to include all inventors).
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Judge Newman's rationale focused primarily on equity princi-
ples, rather than specific statutory or judicial authority. In contrast
to her explanation of the amended joint inventorship provision in
which she cited more than ample authority to illustrate that prior
law needlessly invalidated patents, she cited almost no authority for
her proposition that joint owners today must be more than joint in-
ventors under the statute. For example, she stated that "the law of
shared ownership was founded on shared invention; a situation that
admittedly does not here prevail .... No theory of the law of prop-
erty supports such a distortion of ownership rights."'' Similarly,
she noted, without citing authority, that "it is not an implementation
of the common law of property, or its statutory embodiments to
treat all persons, however minor their contribution, as full owners of
the entire property as a matter of law. The law had never given a
contributor to a minor portion of an invention a full share of the
originator's patent."'92 Moreover, she seemed to suggest that no spe-
cific authority was necessary to support her point. In particular, she
noted that: "By amending [Patent Act section] 116 in order to re-
move an antiquated pitfall whereby patents were being unjustly in-
validated, the legislators surely did not intend to create another
inequity. Apparently no one foresaw that judges might routinely
transfer pre-1984 ownership concepts into the changed inventorship
law."193
B. Contracting Around Current Inventorship Laws
Regardless of whether the traditional link between joint in-
ventorship and joint ownership continues, patients can nonetheless
obtain patent rights through current mechanisms that exist outside
the patent system. In particular, patients can contract for outcomes
other than the default patent rules discussed in the previous section.
Although patients may not qualify as joint inventors, because patent
ownership is subject to assignment, patients can negotiate for at least
partial assignment of ownership rights even if they are not joint
inventors.
191 Id. at 1472 (Newman, J., dissenting). In particular, she noted that prior to the 1984 amend-
ments the joint inventor in this case, Mr. Choi, could not have been named a joint inventor
because he had not conceived and contributed to the entire invention, as was required
under the previous statute. Id. at 1468 (Newman, J., dissenting) (quoting Stearns v. Bar-
rett, 22 F.Cas. 1175, 1181 (C.C.D. Mass. 1816) (Story, J.) (noting that joint invention must be
the simultaneous production of the genius and labor of both parties)).
M Id. at 1471.
193 Id.
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Although still relatively rare, some patients have had the fore-
sight and ability to contract for part-ownership of prospective pat-
ent rights before granting access to any biological material. In
particular, patient-based group PXE International set up its own
bank of biological material and requires that interested researchers
must agree to share any resulting patent rights before accessing the
material.194 Although a lawyer for PXE International has cast some
doubt on the language of previous contracts used by the group, the
principle of contracting for different results should be a sound one
that is specifically contemplated by the current patent laws. 195
While this may provide a ray of hope to some patients who
have the incredible legal foresight to demand a contract for rights in
any potential patent before providing a biological sample, the logis-
tics would obviously fail to embrace most, if not all, patients who
could attempt to do this. For example, although PXE has established
a convenient mechanism for collecting biological material from pa-
tients, the contract model is atypical. In addition, if there is no pre-
existing patient group for a patient contributor to contact, a single
patient would be at a significant disadvantage in demanding any
terms of agreement from researchers. In fact, the prospect of having
to take additional steps may be a disincentive for those initially in-
clined to contribute.
Although it is possible to envision a situation where the con-
tractual approach is more accessible to patients, this possibility may
still be remote in the typical situation where the patient is at a loss
for any alternatives. Accordingly, even if procedures were imple-
mented to require that patients receive more informed consent re-
garding the potential consequences of their donations, it is
questionable whether this would impact their decisions signifi-
cantly. Detailed disclosure of potential commercialization, or even
the ability to seek counsel, may have little impact on a contributing
patient who has no other present treatment options. Accordingly,
'9 Fleischer, Seeking Rights to Crucial Gene, supra note 49, at C1.
19 The attorney for PXE who didn't see the contract until afterwards noted that although the
document stated that "[a]ny patent shall be applied for jointly," the implication that this
suggested that the parties were joint inventors should not hold. See Fleischer, Patent Thy-
self, supra note 57, at 87 (noting that he would have to look more closely at the terms). See
also Paul Smaglik, Tissue Donors Use Their Influence in Deal Over Gene Patent Tens, NA-
TURE, Oct. 19, 2000 (noting that a "joint patent application" had been filed by PXE Interna-
tional, which had provided scientists at the University of Hawaii with biological material
from the PXE's private blood and tissue bank); 35 U.S.C. § 116 (2001) (patents have attrib-
utes of personal property and can accordingly be conveyed).
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although contracting is a legal option, it may not be a viable one to
patients in this position.
In addition, it is questionable whether the PXE approach is the
optimal approach for either protecting patient rights or for promot-
ing research. Although the PXE approach does allow patients to
share their contributions and have a "voice" in the dissemination of
resulting technology, it requires a patient-based group, as well as
sufficient numbers of afflicted individuals, to agree to work to-
gether. In addition, allowing patients leverage in terms of licensing
patents may further exacerbate an existing problem in biotechnol-
ogy, with respect to a seeming plethora of patents that must be ne-
gotiated around before any work may be done.196 The additional
requirements imposed by a patient group may actually deter re-
searchers from a certain field because of the administrative burdens.
C. Moore Thoughts: Patent Sanctions
Another possibility for patient contributors who seek to control
access of patented technology is to penalize patent owners with
unenforceability. For example, Judge Mosk's dissent in Moore sug-
gested that where a patent was obtained without proper informed
consent, the patent should be unenforceable as a matter of equity.197
Of course, Mosk was remarking on the unique factual situation of
the Moore case in which the patient contributions were obtained al-
most entirely under fraudulent pretenses. The Moore case is mark-
ediy different than those where patients donate biological materials
to researchers. 198 In most cases, patients are arguably misled because
of their failure to comprehend the implications of their contribu-
tions.199 However, Mosk's argument for complete unenforceability
of a patent is less compelling without explicit fraudulent overtones.
This is particularly true because unenforceability is considered a
19 See, e.g., Eisenberg, supra note 80, at 163; Long, supra note 80, at 827-36; Rai, supra note 80,
at 192-94. See also Janice M. Mueller, No "Dilettante Affair": Rethinking the Experimental Use
Exception to Patent Infringement for Biomedical Research Tools, 76 WASH. L. Rev. 1, 5-6 (2001)
(noting that there has been increasing difficulty in accessing patented research tools and
that transaction costs are likely to continue to escalate as companies continue to acquire
proprietary tools).
197 Moore, 51 Cal. 3d at 168 (Mosk, J., dissenting). In addition, he noted that "a patent is not a
license to defraud." Id.
198 See supra notes 39-49 and accompanying text (describing sample scenarios for patient
contributions).
199 See supra notes 56-68 and accompanying text (describing patient perceptions).
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very severe penalty that typically applies only to egregious conduct
during patent procurement.200
In addition, while general equity principles may provide justi-
fication for a change in the law, the typical circumstances where
courts find patents unenforceable do not readily embrace Mosk's
suggestion. Currently, the conduct that gives rise to unenforceabil-
ity is fraudulent procurement of the patent, sometimes referred to as
"fraud on the PTO;''20 1 moreover, only if fraud rises to the level of
inequitable conduct will the high penalty of total unenforceability of
a patent be exacted.20 2 In particular, the fraud must be considered
material to the patentability analysis, meaning that the information
would have been at least relevant to a reasonable patent examiner's
determination of patentability, if not precluding patentability alto-
gether.20 3 In addition to being material to patentability, the law of
inequitable conduct requires an actual intent to deceive the PTO be-
200 See infra note 201.
201 The other situation where fraud may arise in a patent context involves antitrust claims,
although such a case typically requires more than fraudulent procurement of a patent.
Accordingly, because of the remoteness of this, it is not discussed within this section. See
M. Eagles Tool Warehouse, Inc. v. Fisher Tooling Co., inc., 203 F. Supp.2d 306, 317 (D.NJ.
2002).
202 See Molins PLC v. Textron, Inc., 48 F.3d 1172 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (noting that loss of a patent is
a justified penalty for inequitable conduct because the statutory period of exclusivity was
sought through improper means). This is a particularly severe penalty because unlike de-
fenses against the patent's invalidity, an accusation of inequitable conduct of even some
claims will make the entire patent unenforceable. See Kingsdown v. Hollister, 863 F.3d 867
(Fed. Cir. 1988); 35 U.S.C. § 116 (2001) (noting that invalidity of one claim does not impact
the validity of the other claims); see also Rohm & Haas Co. v. Crystal Chem. Co., 722 F.2d
1556 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (noting that while underlying conduct that renders a patent unen-
forceable may later be purged, the patent is permanently unenforceable). Moreover, ineq-
uitable conduct during the procurement of one patent may taint related patents, making
them also unenforceable. See Consolidated Alum. Corp. v. Foseco Intern, Ltd., 910 F.2d 804
(Fed. Cir. 1990). The severity of the penalty is also reflected by the stringent level of proof
required; there must be clear and convincing evidence of intentional misrepresentation or
withholding of material facts to form the basis of an inequitable conduct charge. See, e.g.,
In re Harita, 847 F.2d 801, 808 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (noting that violation of duty of disclosure
must be established by clear and convincing evidence).
20 See, e.g., Merck & Co. v. Danbury Pharmacal, Inc., 873 F.2d 1418, 1421 (Fed Cir. 1989); see
also 37 C.F.R. 56 (providing specific criteria on what constitutes information that is mate-
rial to patentability). Typically, acts that could form the basis of such a claim include af-
firmative misrepresentations of material fact, failure to disclose material information, or
submissions of intentionally misleading information. Moreover, information that is not
prior art is typically considered to not be material, even if the information might have
made a patent examiner consider the invention unpatentable. See, e.g., Northern Telecom
v. Datapoint Corp., 908 F.2d 931, 934-35 (Fed. Cir. 1990); Environmental Designs v. Union
Oil, 713 F.2d 693, 996-97 (Fed Cir. 1993); Specialty Composites v. Cabot Corp, 845 F.2d 981
(Fed Cir 1988).
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cause complete unenforceability of a patent is such a severe pen-
alty.204 However, in the case of failing to disclose patient
contributions, unless the law changes with respect to whether pa-
tients can jointly conceive of an invention, failure to disclose the
identity of patients, or even their contributions, would not rise to
the level of material information for patentability purposes. Al-
though patients believe that but for their actions, no patentable in-
vention would have been conceived in the first instance, this
information is not material to whether the ultimate invention is pat-
entable. In addition, allowing information that is not material to the
patentability analysis to be the basis for inequitable conduct runs
counter to the traditional basis for such unenforceability. 205 Moreo-
ver, it should be noted that allegations of fraud are considered to be
a "much-abused and too often last-resort allegation" already, with-
out pushing the boundaries of what is considered fraud.206
In addition, even if the patent laws were amended to make
patents unenforceable if patient contributions were not properly
disclosed to the patent office, it is unclear whether this would be an
optimal approach. In particular, for patients who want a share of
patent profits, creating a new rule for unenforceability would ne-
gate any such hope of profits. Nonetheless, if patients cannot be
considered joint inventors, an unenforceability rule might provide a
helpful bargaining platform for some patients. Accordingly, per-
haps patients should advocate a new patent rule requiring all patent
applicants to disclose the extent of patient contributions to the in-
vention, as well as what compensation, if any, has been provided
for such contributions.20 7 Such a rule would represent a major shift
in the law of unenforceability. However, it is mentioned as one po-
tential pathway that could be further developed into a useful tool
for patients.
D. Considering Analogous Areas
This section considers alternative approaches to address the
concerns of patient contributors. In particular, this section broadens
204 See Tol-O-Matic v. Proma Produkt-Und Mktg., 945 F.2d 1546, 1553 (Fed. Cir. 1991); Halli-
burton v. Schlumberger, 925 F.2d 1435, 1439 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
205 See supra note 203.
2m See FMC Corp. v. Manitowoc Co., 835 F.2d 1411 (Fed. Cir. 1987); see also Burlington v.
Dayco, 849 F.2d 1418, 1421 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (noting that "charging inequitable conduct in
almost every major patent case has become an absolute plague").
207 See generally 35 C.F.R. 1.56 (providing current rules of information disclosure).
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the inquiry to consider analogous problems in other disciplines, as
well as patent law itself. For example, problems in the definition of
scientific authorship offer a parallel situation to the problem of in-
cluding patient contributors within the definition of joint inventors.
Similarly, some of the assertions of patient contributors mirror
claims of database owners who seek protection for their compila-
tions of factual information that are currently unprotected by patent
or copyright laws, but which may soon be entitled to sui generis pro-
tection. Also, the situation of patient contributors bears striking re-
semblance to that of indigenous communities who have had their
biological material taken from them without compensation, but for
whom there are now growing legal strategies to counter this phe-
nomenon. Finally, this section returns to patent law to consider the
analogous issue of all situations where genetic gold-diggers are able
to obtain patent rights, rather than focusing on the smaller subset of
gold-diggers involved with patient contributors. This final section's
suggestion complements the discussions of appropriate credit and
proper incentive in other areas, and returns full circle to the realm of
patent law, in proposing a reevaluation of inventorship of isolated
genetic material.
1. Scientific Authorship
The issue of whether the authorship credit of scientific articles
should be adjusted to better reflect changing times offers an impor-
tant parallel area of consideration. Although the standards for pat-
ent inventorship and scientific authorship are distinct, both require
some type of novelty.208 In addition, both provide a reward to indi-
viduals for their innovation, albeit with different types of rewards.
For example, scientific authorship does not convey the same types
208 See supra notes 14-17 and accompanying text (explaining the patentability requirements of
novelty and nonobviousness); Authors, CELL, at http://www.cell.com/misc/authors.
shtml (noting that only "novel results" in the area of experimental biology are considered
for publication); How to get published in Nature, NATuRE, at http://www.nature.com/na-
ture/submit/getpublished/index.htnl (requiring "original scientific research" of "out-
standing importance" that has not been previously reported); Information and Help for
Science Authors, at http://www.sciencemag.org/feature/contribinfo/home.shtml (noting
publication requirement of "best original scientific research," with priority given to "pa-
pers that reveal novel concepts of broad interest"). In addition, it is possible to receive a
patent and publish an article concerning the same invention. However, a patent applica-
tion must be filed no later than one year from the date of the publication, or first public
disclosure. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1994). In addition, the rule for most countries outside
the United States prohibit patents that are applied at any time after the date of publication.
See, e.g., Convention on the Grant of European Patents, Oct. 4, 1973, 13 I.L.M. 270 arts. 54-
55.
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of monetary rewards typically associated with patents. Rather, in
the scientific arena, the reward is not monetary, but more a matter
of attribution that translates into positive professional recognition.20 9
However, a recent challenge in both areas has been the changing
nature and types of contributions.210 In particular, the increasing col-
laboration among scientists that impacted the inventorship defini-
tion in patent law also impacted the definition of scientific
authorship.
The increasing collaborations among scientists produced
problems in determining authorship because the traditional model
assumed a single author was solely responsible for all of the work
involved.211 If the definition of authorship were narrowly construed
to approximate the prior model of a single author, some contribu-
tors were denied any authorship credit. The unfairness of a narrow
definition of scientific authorship is analogous to claims of patient
contributors who, "while not engaged in the conceptualization and
writing of a certain publication, still made such work possible."2 12 Al-
ternatively, a broader scope of authorship would inequitably inflate
the term by recognizing minor and major contributions identi-
cally.213 The broader authorship concept is also somewhat analogous
to the patent context because a wider scope of patent inventors
would convey greater rights to a larger group of people and possi-
bly be inconsistent with established principles of inventorship.
The similar problems in the scientific and patent context, com-
bined with actual modifications of scientific authorship suggest that
the patent concepts may be usefully modified, based upon the anal-
ogous area of scientific authorship. In particular, specific organiza-
tions responsible for publishing scientific journals have adjusted
their definition of authorship to better reflect current research reali-
ties. For example, some leading scientific journals such as the Jour-
209 See, e.g., Mario Biagioli, Rights or Rewards? Changing Context and Definitions of Scientific
Authorship, 27 J.C. & U.L. 83, 84-85.
210 See, e.g., id. at 83 (noting the impact that the increasing collaborative environment within
academia has for the definition of scientific authorship, as well as for patent law).
211 Id. at 92 (noting that changing research methods created problems in the definition of
scientific authorship because it became difficult to conceive of a single author who 'had
the idea, did the work, wrote the paper, and took credit and responsibility... .
212 Id. at 93.
213 For example, where there was a substantial collaboration, a long list of authors failed to
distinguish those who provided the initial impetus for the project from those who oversaw
the project, from those who carried out the instructions of others. Accordingly, to some
authors, creating too many authors actually diluted the authorship credit.
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nal of American Medicine (JAMA) have substituted the word
contributor for the word and concepts typically associated with the
word "author" to provide adequate attribution to each person "who
has added usefully to the work."214 The number of contributors is
not limited, but each contributor's actual contribution, expressed as
a numerical figure, is denoted on the article's first page. 215
The evolving definition of scientific authorship may convey
some important lessons to the patient contributor scenario. In par-
ticular, the principles supporting the new definition of contributors
could be utilized to redefine joint inventorship in a manner that en-
compasses patient contributors. Just as the prior definition of scien-
tific authorship was too narrow to some contributors, so to the
present definition of joint inventorship is too narrow to include pa-
tient contributors. The parallel is particularly compelling for patient
contributors in cases where but for their assistance - even if it does
not rise to the level of inventorship - the patentable invention
would not have been discovered, or discovered as quickly.216 Even
the cases that deny inventorship status to patients acknowledge that
they did provide some contribution towards the invention.217 Ac-
cordingly, the contribution scenario for scientific authorship would
seem to more readily embrace and acknowledge patients' efforts.
Although the precise definition of contribution would likely be diffi-
cult to agree upon, a broad definition that included all whose contri-
butions were essential to development of the patented invention
would be a starting point for including patient contributors.218
However, the JAMA approach would likely not be incorpo-
rated wholesale into patent laws because of important distinctions
214 Biagoli, supra note 209, at 96 (quoting Rennie et al., When Authorship Fails: A Proposal to
Make Contributors Accountable, 278 JAMA 579, 582 (1997)).
215 Id.
216 See supra notes 42-49 and accompanying text (discussing the research value of using iso-
lated populations to isolate genetic links); supra notes 170-73 (discussing Judge Mosk's
arguments concerning patient Moore's pivotal role in the patented compound).
217 See, e.g., supra notes 155-57 and accompanying text (noting court's recognition of patient
contribution, although ultimately denying inventorship rights to her); see also supra notes
158-67 (discussing cases where inventorship was denied to those who arguably were es-
sential to the development of the patented invention).
218 For example, conception could be re-conceived to include all persons who were necessary
contributors to a patented invention. See generally Moore, 51 Cal.3d at 169 (Mosk, dissent-
ing). However, it is acknowledged that this would likely be difficult because even in cases
where patients supply an important contribution, it is possible that they only accelerate a
result, but that the result could have been created without them. See generally supra notes
42-43 (noting that scientists sought certain groups to assist in the acceleration of research).
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between scientific authorship and patent inventorship. As a practi-
cal matter, because scientific authorship is not a legal concept, it was
easier to modify219 Moreover, patent inventorship typically conveys
actual rights that impact others, whereas scientific authorship pri-
marily provides recognition to individuals.220 The patent rights that
are inherently tied to joint inventorship accordingly do not dovetail
with the concept of proportional contribution. In particular, the con-
tribution approach does not resolve the apportionment of owner-
ship rights, which are currently directly tied to inventorship.21
A possible modification of the scientific contribution approach
to the patent context would be to provide differing ownership inter-
ests, based upon the amount of contribution. However, this is only
suggested as a starting point for discussion since it may be difficult
to build consensus on definitions of contribution and ownership. In
addition, if all contributors were provided partial ownership inter-
ests, rather than the current control provided to joint inventors, pa-
tients may have less control over the total outcome than under the
traditional joint inventorship and ownership model. Nonetheless, a
modified contribution standard may be a much more realistic op-
tion. In particular, whereas joint inventorship is a difficult threshold
for patients to meet, a contribution standard might be more easily
satisfied. Additionally, although partial ownership rights would not
completely satisfy their desire for control, some rights would at
least begin to address some of the current problems with patient
perceptions. Perhaps of even greater value, though, is that so long
as some rights are provided to patient contributors, they may enable
patient contributors to negotiate more effectively for rights that bet-
ter fulfill their ideals and goals. At a minimum, any rights provided
to patients at this point would be better than the default scenario
that the PXE group is contracting against, in which patients are pre-
219 There is more flexibility to provide differing approaches to scientific authorship since
there have historically been differing laws for different disciplines and institutions, in con-
trast to the uniform federal definition of joint inventors. See Biagioli, supra note 209, at 83
(noting that "definitions of scientific authorship, far from being codified in a corpus of
doctrine like intellectual property law, do change across disciplines and institutions"). In
addition, while patent rights may be transferred contractually, scientific credit and author-
ship are not considered property rights, but rather, are considered inseparable from the
actual author. Id. at 91 (noting that while intellectual property rights may be transferred
contractually, scientific authorship is seen as inalienable from the original author).
2
a'See id. at 97 (noting that one of the reasons the new definition of "contributor" works for
scientific authorship is that the system is one based on rewards, not rights).
221 See supra notes 97-99 and accompanying text (explaining the correlation between in-
ventorship and ownership).
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sumed to have no rights at all. Of course, the precise balance of
rights is the linchpin of an eventual solution, but the scientific au-
thorship scenario should encourage efforts to consider solutions
outside the current framework of joint inventorship.
2. Database Rights
Another analogous issue to the patient contributors' lack of
compensation exists in the fringes of the copyright arena.222 In par-
ticular, the patient contributor claims mildly echo those of database
compilers who allege that they should be entitled to copyright own-
ership, or at least copyright-like protection that would provide rec-
ognition of their work.223 In both cases, the claims are essentially
222 In addition, although beyond the scope of this article, the consideration of joint inventor-
ship rights for patient contributors could potentially be compared with those of joint au-
thors, who are provided analogous protection under copyright laws, albeit with important
distinctions. For example, joint copyright owners must account to all joint authors,
whereas joint inventors currently have no such requirement. Compare 17 U.S.C. § 203
(2000) with 35 U.S.C. § 262 (1999). In addition, the respective standards for protection, as
well as scope of protection are different. See infra note 256 and accompanying text (noting
that the patentability threshold of novelty is higher than the copyright standard of origi-
nality and that the scope of a patent is broader than the scope of copyright protection).
Nonetheless, the issue of joint authorship in the copyright arena is a similarly contentious
issue. See, e.g., Dreyfuss, supra note 98, at 1161; see also F. Jay Dougherty, Not a Spike Lee
Joint? Issues in the Authorship of Motion Pictures Under U.S. Copyright Law, 49 UCLA L. REv.
225 (2001) (examining contributors to motion pictures who currently fail to qualify as co-
authors under the copyright laws and proposing alternative rules of copyright owner-
ship); Mary LaFrance, Authorship, Dominance, and the Captive Collaborator: Preserving the
Rights of Joint Authors, 50 EMORY L.J. 193 (2001) (proposing a narrowing of the definition of
joint authorship that is arguably more consistent with the language and purpose of copy-
right law); Russ VerSteeg, Defining 'Author' For Purposes of Copyright, 45 AM. U. L. REv.
1275 (1996).
223 See, e.g., Status of Intellectual Property Law and the Internet, 146 CONG. REc. S10986-06,
106th Cong., 2d Sess. (Oct. 25, 2000) (arguing that creators of databases invest substantial
resources in creating the databases and need legal protection akin to copyright protection
to ensure that investment in databases will not diminish, to the detriment of society); Le-
gal Protection for Data Bases, 143 CoNG. REc. S10263, 105th Cong., 1st Sess. (Oct. 1, 1997)
(arguing that legal protection of databases is an important national and international issue,
based, in part on a report by the U.S. Copyright Office); Statement of Hon. Carlos Moor-
head, The Database Investment and Intellectual Property Anti-Piracy Act of 1996, 142
CONG. REC. E 890, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. (May 23, 1996) (commenting that compilations of
factual material are "absolutely indispensable to the American economy on the verge of
the new century" and that because of changes in copyright law, new legislation is neces-
sary to continue to provide incentives for a strong U.S. market). In addition, there is some
international pressure to provide protection for database creators because the EU has al-
ready provided similar protection and the EU Directive stipulates that database protection
in Europe will only be provided to foreign database owners if their home countries have
adopted similar legislation. See Directive 96/9/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council of the EU of 11 March 1996 on the Legal Protection of Databases, 1996 O.J. L (77)
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that effort or natural ability should be rewarded under intellectual
property laws, or under new laws that provide similar scope of pro-
tection. Current copyright law does not protect mere effort itself;
rather, copyright protection only applies when there is a sufficient
modicum of creative expression.224 The underlying data, as opposed
to the expression or presentation of data, is not protected.225 In addi-
tion, while contract law could be utilized in both instances, a con-
tract approach is necessarily less comprehensive because it requires
negotiation of every individual situation 2 6
Database owners have argued for a change in the law to pro-
tect the data itself. In particular, it has been argued that without
specific protection of database rights, there will actually be a disin-
centive to create stores of factual material that are, in fact, in soci-
ety's best interest.227 In addition, while a database owner may
endeavor to keep the database proprietary, the risk that others
could copy substantial parts without legal ramification has been
cited as an additional reason for the need of another legal right 28
Accordingly, several proposals have been introduced before Con-
gress that provide a so-called "database right" to these owners.229
20, reprinted in THE NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, A QUESTION OF BALANCE: PRIVATE RicHTs IN
ScIENTIc AND TECHNICAL DATABASES (1999), Appendix A, recital 56.
224 Feist Publ'n, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv., 499 U.S. 340, 34445 (1991).
225 See id. See also 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1994) (limiting copyright protection to "original works of
authorship that are fixed in any tangible medium of expression").
226 See supra notes 194-96 and accompanying text (describing the ability of patients to contract
for rights relating to their contributions, but also recognizing that most patients would be
unable to effectively do so). Moreover, database owners have asserted that contract rights
alone are inadequate protection.
22 See supra note 223 and accompanying text (noting arguments in support of a database
right).
I2 d.
229 See, e.g., Consumer and Investor Access to Information Act, H.R. 1858, 106th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1999); Collections of Information Antipiracy Act II, H.R. 354,106th Cong., 2d Session
(1999) (proposing to amend the copyright act to provide protection for database informa-
tion); H.R. 1858 106th Cong., 1st Sess., (1999); Database Investment and Intellectual Prop-
erty Antipiracy Act, H.R. 3531. 104th Cong. (1996); Collections of Information Antipiracy
Act, H.R. 2652 (1997); see also A QUESTION OF BALANCE, supra 223, at 73-110 (1999) (provid-
ing an overview of federal bills, as well as specific recommendations from the National
Research Council); Michael Freno, Note, Database Protection: Resolving tire U.S. Database Di-
lemma with an Eye Toward International Protection, 34 CORNELL INT'L L. J. 165 (2001) (provid-
ing an overview of the various legislative proposals, as well as the international
framework for database protection and a suggested compromise proposal for a database
right).
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However, the propriety of such a right remains controver-
sial.230
Although the underlying calls to recognize efforts that cur-
rently fall short of intellectual property protection is similar to that
expressed in the patient contributor situation, the situations diverge
on the underlying issues. For the typical database owner, the in-
creased protection is desirable from a purely financial standpoint;
the owner desires to recoup investment and maximize profit. How-
ever, patients who would contribute to a database are not solely in-
terested in monetary concerns. Rather, patients are also interested in
ensuring that their contributions will result in treatments that are
publicly available. 231 In addition, unlike the pure database situation,
the information available from a patient database may not be com-
mercially valuable in the first instance. Rather, further research may
be required before any commercial value is attained. Accordingly,
the database model is not a direct corollary for the issues of patient
contributors. In addition, none of the proposed database rights
would satisfy the goals of patients. In particular, all of the propos-
als for enhanced legal protection thus far merely protect another
from copying the contents of the database; none would demand that
rights be provided to the initial database owner for any derivative
products.232
Nonetheless, the fact that patient contributor concerns are not
presently addressed in legislative proposals does not foreclose that
option. Indeed, consideration of alternative viewpoints as to why a
database right should be adopted may be productive for the present
database proponents as well. In addition, collaboration with
database proponents may be fruitful for patients because there is
already strong political impetus behind the proposals. Alterna-
tively, patient contributors can consider the legislative proposals of
database proponents as merely an example of a new sui generis sys-
230 For example, some believe that it is inappropriate to create a right for those who the Su-
preme Court has clearly held to be outside the Copyright Act. See A QUESTION OF BAL-
ANCE, supra note 223, at 57 (noting that some argue that Congress lacks the ability to
extend copyright beyond the minimum necessary to provide sufficient incentive to au-
thors to make their works available); J.H. Reichman & Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Prop-
erty Rights in Data?, 50 VAND. L. REv. 51 (1997) (endorsing some type of legal relief to assist
in the creation and distribution of electronic data, but opposing the creation of any strong
legal barriers to entry in the field).
231 See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text (noting that patient contributors want and
expect the results of their contributions to be freely available to others).
232 See supra note 229 (noting proposals for a database right).
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tem of protection; patients can propose their own legislation that is
more tailored to their concerns.233
3. Bio-Piracy of Indigenous Populations
The patient-patent problem is also strikingly similar to the
global problem regarding bio-piracy of indigenous populations. In
both situations, those who provide or facilitate the provision of raw
materials that result in a patentable composition are typically de-
nied any rights in a resulting patent. The parallel situation is partic-
ularly interesting since the patent-owner in both cases is typically a
relatively large life-science company that does not interact directly
with the contributors.234 In addition, just as this Article has explored
whether providing property rights would advance the cause of pa-
tient contributors, so too have advocates of indigenous populations
considered granting property interests for indigenous populations
under either traditional schemes of intellectual property protection,
or via sui generis legislation.235
The criticisms of patient contributors are very similar to the
complaints waged against companies criticized for taking knowl-
edge and biological material from indigenous populations of other
countries. The bad press that is beginning to circulate concerning
233 Of course, sui generis intellectual property protection that provides analogues to both pat-
ent and copyright law exists beyond the database issue. The most analogous area would
be the Orphan Drug Act, which provides patent-like exclusivity for drugs that might not
otherwise be developed by large pharmaceutical companies because of limited the scope
of diseases. Although the Orphan Drug Act is premised on providing a reward to the
company who creates a new discovery, perhaps an amendment of the Act itself, or a simi-
lar approach, could be helpful in providing an incentive to companies, as well as a reward
to patients. Although further consideration of this may be fruitful, it is presently beyond
the scope of this article. However, for some useful information on the current Orphan
Drug Act, see Rohde, supra note 177, at 125; Bohrer & Prince, supra note 177 at 365. How-
ever, it should be also noted that the underlying premises of this Act have been ques-
tioned. See, e.g., John Flynn, The Orphan Drug Act: An Unconstitutional Exercise of the Patent
Power, 1992 UTAH L. REV. 389 (1992). Moreover, whether a sui generis approach is even
proper, is an additional issue with respect to database protection. See Jacqueline Lipton,
Matters of Fact: Refocusing the Database Debate (manuscript on file with author).
2
m See supra notes 59-62 and accompanying text (noting the fact that many patient contribu-
tions ultimately are owned by corporations because researchers are often required to as-
sign all interests as part of their employment agreement).
235 See, e.g., Michael J. Huft, Comment, Indigenous Peoples and Drug Discovery Research: A Ques-
tion of Intellectual Property Rights, 89 Nw. U. L. REv. 1678 (1995) (considering whether con-
tribution of indigenous knowledge would constitute joint inventorship under the patent
laws); Naoi Roht-Arriaza, Of Seeds and Shamans: The Appropriation of the Scientific and
Technical Knowledge of Indigenous and Local Communities, 17 MICH. J. INT'L L. 919 (1996)
(critiquing the present patent and plant breeder rights' regimes as inappropriate answers
to appropriation of knowledge of indigenous communities).
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patents derived from patient contributors also echoes the negative
press that companies face regarding the use of indigenous knowl-
edge and biological materials.236 In addition, just as well-publicized
incidents of bio-piracy based upon indigenous agricultural re-
sources have created distrust, the patient contributors who are used
without reward are also beginning to show signs of distrust and
reluctance as well.237 As already seen in the context of indigenous
contributions, when trust deteriorates, cooperation is stymied and
ultimately, greater knowledge to society may be frustrated.238
The problems that patients face in attempting to contract for
desired results are also similar to those of indigenous groups who
attempt to contract with the multi-national groups. In both of these
situations, any contract entered into is unlikely to be a contract be-
tween equal parties.239 In addition, both situations share a funda-
mental problem in contract negotiations because the information
disclosed is valuable, but of unknown value at the time of negotia-
tion. Admittedly, the knowledge disclosed reduces uncertainty for
companies searching for patentable genes. However, there remains
some degree of uncertainty in whether the company that obtains the
contributions can actually harness the knowledge because of a num-
ber of additional factors ranging from scientific expertise, to the
competitive market, patent concerns, and the nature of science
itself.240
One approach to the unequal bargaining power has been uti-
lized in both situations as well. In particular, the idea of a collecting
society or agency has been utilized or proposed in both areas, al-
though it is not the norm yet for either. For example, as previously
mentioned, potential patient contributors with PXE created their
own collecting society that wielded sufficient influence to demand
that researchers agree to share patent rights before providing access
236 These companies were often charged with accusations of biopiracy and at a minimum, had
public relations problems. See Peter Drahos, Indigenous Knowledge, Intellectual Property and
Biopiracy: Is a Global Bio-Collecting Society the Answer? 6 EUR. INTELL. PROP'. REP. 245 (2001).
237 See supra notes 56-68 and accompanying text (describing negative patient perceptions to
the discovery that patents exclude them from medical treatment).
238 Drahos, supra note 236, at 246-47.
239 See id. at 267 (noting that "[c]learly, a contract between an indigenous group and a mul-
tinational corporation is not a contract between equally well-resourced parties"); see also
Sarah Laird, Contracts for Biodiversity Prospecting, in BIODWERSUTY PROSPECTING 99 (describ-
ing the contractual approach, as well as potential problems for indigenous companies).
240 See Drahos, supra note 236, at 247.
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to any biological materials.24' In addition, even in the case of the
Canavan contributors, there was a smaller-scale organization of
similarly situated patients, although the group did not attempt to
leverage their numbers.242 Nonetheless, both situations reflect pro-
posals that have been suggested for addressing the parallel issues
encountered with indigenous populations. Namely, there have been
suggestions for the creation of a global bio-collecting society to bet-
ter integrate efforts as well as provide enhanced bargaining abilities
during contractual negotiations.243
Because of the parallels, the more extensive lessons from con-
tributions of indigenous populations could be considered, rather
than approaching the patient contributor problem anew. In addi-
tion, although bio-piracy problems often focus on preserving bi-
odiversity, which is not typically an issue for patient contributors,
there is prior experience and even an international context that pro-
vides a basis for the sharing of research benefits with contributors.
For example, the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) pro-
motes sharing research results - it provides that member states
should take "legislative, administrative or policy measures ... with
the aim of sharing in a fair and equitable way the results of research
and development and the benefits arising from the commercial and
other utilization of genetic resources with the Contracting Party pro-
viding such resources." 44 Similarly, the Human Genome Organisa-
241 See supra note 49 (describing the PXE contractual approach). In addition, PXE actually
attempted to take their approach to the global level. See, e.g., Andy Coghlan, People With
Inherited Diseases are Ready to Challenge Pro-Lifers Over the Future of Medical Research, NEw
ScIENrIsT, Feb. 2, 2001, at 4 (noting attempts to create a global alliance to represent patients
with rare hereditary conditions that was presented by PXE International founders at a
BioVision meeting on Biotechnology in Lyons, France).
242 See supra note 48 and accompanying text (describing the fact that Canavan patients organ-
ized the collection of biological materials from a pool of patients to accelerate research
progress).
243 See Drahos, supra note 236, at 247-249. In addition, even if there is no official collecting
society, another approach that can be borrowed from the bio-piracy area is to create and
widely distribute model contract agreements. See, e.g., Downes et al., Biodiversity Prospect-
ing Contract, in BIODIvERsrrY PROSPECING 255-87 (1993).
244 CBD art. 15(7); see also Council Directive 98/44 on Legal Protection of Biotechnological
Inventions 1998 O.J. (L 213) 13 (providing that materials taken from patients for patenting
should at least be acknowledged); Francesca Grifo & David Downes, Agreements to Collect
Biodiversity for Pharmaceutical Research: Major Issues and Proposed Principles, in BRUsH &
STABINSKY, VALUING LOCAL KNowLEDGE 281-304 (1996). Interestingly, the CBD also offers
a suggestion on another topic that relates to patient contributions - informed consent. In
particular, the CBD provides that "access to genetic resources shall be subject to prior
informed consent." Id. at Art. 15(5). As discussed earlier, however, whether consent is
meaningful is a complex and thorny issue.
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tion has emphasized that researchers should share the benefits of
their research with subjects who have assisted in the enterprise.245 In
addition, individual corporations have taken steps to compensate
indigenous communities in some circumstances.246
4. Re-Defining Inventorship of Isolated Genetic Material
A final analogous area to consider is a reevaluation of in-
ventorship of all isolated genetic material, regardless of patient as-
sistance. In particular, this section suggests that the current law,
which recognizes the one who isolates a genetic compound as the
creator of a patentable composition, should be questioned. While
this may seem to be a radically different approach, as well as one
that would be resisted strongly by established pharmaceutical and
genomic companies, it nonetheless should be considered as an alter-
native in the re-conceptualization of a framework that provides
proper incentives.
This proposal stems from the under-current to patient contrib-
utor claims that named inventors of patents based on patient contri-
butions are over-compensated. Interestingly, with the exception of
groups such as PXE, patients typically do not seek inventorship
rights in the first instance. Rather, they assume and expect that re-
search will just result in greater good for all. Accordingly, patients'
claims to joint inventorship are more typically an attempt to realign
perceived inequities. The patients perceive that their provision of
unique raw material is at least as important, if not more important
than the activities of scientists who isolate the patentable se-
quence. 247 While the patient claims admittedly are based on intuitive
logic, this section suggests that they can be grounded within patent
law principles or at least presented as a proposal to reform patent
law principles regarding inventorship of biotechnology.
245 See Human Genome Organisation, HUGO Ethics Committee, Statement on Benefit-Shar-
ing (April 9, 2000), at http://www.hugo-international.org/hugo/benefit.htn-l; see also
Paul Smaglik, Genetic Diversity Project Fights for Its Life... As Conpanies are Urged to Share
Benefits, 404 NATuRE 912 (April 27 2000).
246 See, e.g., Stephen King et al., Biological Diversity, Indigenous Knowledge, Drug Discovery &
Intellectual Property Rights, in BRUSH & STABINSKY, VALUING LOCAL KNOWLEDGE (describing
different compensation strategies that have been used by Shaman Phannaceuticals that
extend beyond traditional post-commercialization profit sharing).
247 See Brown, 866 F. Supp. at 445 (noting that patient believed that her contribution was cru-
cial to the conception of the patented invention); see also supra note 68 and accompanying
text (describing patients who consider their contribution to be critical to the patented
invention)
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To put the objections of patient contributors in the appropriate
intellectual property jargon, they suggest that isolation of genetic
material is not inventive, or at least no more inventive than their
own contributions of raw material that scientists use for the isola-
tion process. This assertion extends beyond pure inventorship into
the area of patentability, including whether such compounds are
truly novel. While most practicing attorneys likely would dismiss
this suggestion as untenable because of extensive precedent holding
otherwise, that is a circular argument.248 However, the patentability
of isolated compounds and genetic sequences has historically been
highly controversial, even if the legal challenge has shifted from ap-
propriate subject matter to technical patentability requirements. 249
The perception that isolated genetic sequences lack sufficient
inventive quality to merit patent protection reflect not only the
views of a few patients, but also an unsettled international issue. In
contrast to the broad patentability of genetic material under United
States law, other countries have declared such material to be unpat-
entable for lack of sufficient novelty or utility °50 In countries with
more restrictive patenting of genetic material, the inventorship issue
is possibly less of an issue. However, the patient contributor situa-
tion in combination with the broad patentability suggests that per-
haps inventorship is another important issue with respect to the
patentability of a compound that is isolated after performing rou-
tine steps and procedures.251 In particular, although present law
considers a wide variety of genetic material patentable, equity argu-
243 See generally supra notes 23, 27-30 and accompanying text (noting that patentability of ge-
netic material is firmly established under United States law, although the technical patent-
ability requirements have been evolving).
249 See, e.g., Molly A. Holman & Stephen R. Munzer, Intellectual Property Rights in Genes and
Gene Fragments: A Registration Solution for Expressed Sequence Tags, 85 IowA L. REv. 735, 735
(2000) (noting the intense controversy over the patentability of gene fragments, including
divergent opinions among academics on the issue); Eisenberg, supra note 4, at 558-61 (pro-
viding a historical perspective of the controversy over corporate attempts to patent gene
sequences).
250 See, e.g., supra notes 22-30 and accompanying text (noting that although such material is
patentable under United States law, the approaches of other countries are not uniform).
Although some might suggest that the United States laws regarding patentability of iso-
lated genetic material should be subject to renewed scrutiny, such proposals are beyond
the scope of this paper. However, for an interesting discussion of utilizing a registration
scheme, rather than patentability, to reward innovation with respect to gene sequences,
see Holman & Munzer, supra note 249, at 813-20.
251 In addition, while the isolation of a gene may be unpredictable in terms of when or even
whether it will occur, the actual process that leads to the result is not a novel concept;
indeed, the process is more analogous to a game of trial and error.
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ments concerning genetic material could potentially be accommo-
dated through a revised definition of inventorship.
In addition, reconceiving the inventorship of genetic material
might better reflect scientific norms. After all, scientists who are ca-
pable of isolating and purifying patentable material often react neg-
atively to gene patents.352 In other words, scientists with the
capacity for creating patentable material question are often the very
individuals who question whether patents are appropriate. Accord-
ingly, perhaps it is time to reconsider whether the current require-
ments of conception and reduction to practice within biotechnology
are consistent with inventorship policies, which tend to favor those
with creative vision, rather than those who labor extensively.253
Returning once again to the intuitive objections of patients, the
claim against allowing scientists to be inventors of isolated genetic
material could be considered as a claim that the current definition of
conception of such inventions is improper. Although patients may
not explicitly articulate a rationale for why scientist efforts are un-
worthy, their objection could be conceived as a claim that the pro-
cess of isolating a natural gene and discovering the function of the
gene still lacks sufficient inventiveness to qualify for a patent and
instead may only reflect hard work. Although "hard work" is not a
traditional ground for denying patentability, it has been a basis for
exclusion from copyright protection. In particular, the United States
Supreme Court has held that work that is produced under the
"sweat of the brow," without sufficient creative expression, fails to
meet basic requirements for copyright law.54 Copyright law re-
quirements are very different than patentability requirements, al-
though most people think of patentability as a higher threshold.55
252 See, e.g., Auth, supra note 4, at 911 (questioning whether ESTs should be patentable).
Granted, scientists may have mixed feelings about patenting any compound because of
the potential negative ramifications for their own research. In addition, it is often difficult
to separate whether the objections are regarding patentability of the subject matter or the
idea that someone should be considered an inventor over the subject matter.
253 See supra notes 31-38 and accompanying text (explaining concepts of inventorship, as well
the underlying policy justifications).
2-4 Feist, 499 U.S. at 353.
255 See, e.g, Robert R. Jones Assocs., Inc. v. Nino Homes, 858 F.2d 274, 278 (6th Cir. 1988)
(noting that originality is easier to establish than novelty); Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda
Fine Arts, 191 F. 2d 99, 102 (2d Cir. 1951) (noting that satisfying the originality requirement
of copyright law is easier than the novelty requirement of patent law in light of the
broader scope of patent protection); 1 NvMER ON CoPYRIc-rr, at 2.01[A] (2002) (clarifying
that it is "now clearly established" that the originality required for copyright only requires
independent creation, but not novelty).
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In particular, any expression with a modicum of creativity - not
necessarily one that is new and nonobvious - is copyrightable if it is
fixed in a tangible medium from which it can be perceived.256 Al-
though copyright law rewards creativity, rather than innovation,
the two standards are analogous and stem from the same constitu-
tional clause. 257
In addition, the Supreme Court's statements in the copyright
context are particularly important here because they suggest that
providing protection to material beyond the scope of the underlying
constitutional clause is impermissible.258 Accordingly, if the activi-
ties of scientists who isolate and purify genetic material were to be
re-conceptualized as hard work, but nonetheless fail to be of suffi-
cient inventive quality to merit patent protection, this could require
a fundamental shift in patent laws.
Of course, it is acknowledged that this suggestion for a recon-
sideration of patentability of isolated genetic material is a radical
proposition.259 Indeed, there is long-standing precedent within the
United States for considering isolated and purified genetic material
to be patentable, with inventorship going to the individual responsi-
ble for conceiving of the actual chemical sequence of the isolated
compound.260 In addition, biotechnology companies who presently
are rewarded with many patents under the current system would
strongly resist such a change.261
256 See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000); Feist, 499 U.S. at 345 (stating that "the requisite level of crea-
tivity is extremely low; even a slight amount will suffice").
257 See generally U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8., cl. 1.
25 See Feist, 499 U.S. at 346-48.
2 However, the suggestion for a re-conceptualization of the presumption that, when iso-
lated, a purified material may be "invented," may not be as radical considering the PTO's
changing position on the patentability of gene sequences themselves. For example, al-
though the PTO previously issued patents on gene fragments and genes of unknown func-
tion, the PTO did respond to criticism that such patents failed to meet the requirement of
utility under patent laws by specifically amending its guidelines on utility to prevent iso-
lated sequences of unknown function from patentability. See supra notes 27-28 and accom-
panying text (regarding changing definition of utility with respect to genes and gene
fragments). Similarly, the PTO material for its own patent examiners has suggested a nar-
row scope for gene fragments with respect to full genes to reduce the likelihood of block-
ing power. See U.S. PATENT & TRAiEMARK OFFIcE, Written Description Guidelines, at
http://wwiv.uspto.gov.
26o See supra notes 104-10 and accompanying text (explaining inventorship rules for concep-
tion of chemical and genetic inventions).
26 See generally supra note I and accompanying text (describing the race to patent genes be-
cause of lucrative profits).
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However, bowing to the economic argument of biotechnology
companies is not only doctrinally improper, but also unnecessary.
In particular, it should be remembered that the frequent claim of
biotechnology companies that patents are critical to their survival is
in fact the same argument of database proponents who are currently
deprived of copyright protection, but seeking an alternative system
of compensation. 262 Accordingly, the suggestion is not to strip bio-
technology companies of all rights based upon their important work
in isolating genetic material, but rather to reconsider whether their
efforts are over-compensated and potentially even unconsti-
tutional.263
CONCLUSION
It remains to be seen whether patients will be entitled to share
in the patent pot of gold that presently exists for isolated genetic
material, or whether there will even be a pot of gold to share. This
article takes an important step in defining the present concerns and
misperceptions of patient contributors. In addition, specific avenues
have been outlined to provide patients and their advocates with
more options to achieve an equitable result. In particular, the broad-
based consideration of patient contributor issues alongside analo-
gous areas should foster a reasoned discussion of incentives and a
reconsideration of current norms to reach a situation that better re-
flects and rewards patient contributors.
In addition, the multi-disciplinary approach of this article
should have continued value beyond the patient contributor situa-
tion. Particularly in the area of biotechnology, there seem to be in-
herent conflicts that arise from the patenting of material that has
important implications for both research and medical treatment. Al-
though there is a tendency to consider every conflict in isolation,
this article suggests a new framework for considering such conflicts
that should hopefully provide for more sustaining solutions. In ad-
dition to forestalling overly narrow approaches, geared principally
towards short-term solutions, this approach is more likely to suc-
ceed on a global level because it inherently requires considerations
of impacted parties other than those currently in conflict.
262 See supra notes 223, 227-28 and accompanying text (describing argument of database pro-
ponents that legal protection analogous to copyright protection is necessary).
263 See Paul J. Heald & Suzanna Sherry, Implied Limits on the Legislative Power: The Intellectual
Property Clause as an Absolute Constraint on Congress, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 1119 (2000).
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The search for more broad-based solutions is critical for the
future development of patent law, including how it accommodates
new technology. After all, although the United States law concern-
ing the patentability of isolated genetic material may appear immu-
table, at one point, this too was an area that was controversial and
the ultimate resolution could have been a very different one. The
continuing evolution of patent law and technologies it must accom-
modate will require further consideration of novel issues. Accord-
ingly, the multidisciplinary approach outlined here may have
continued validity in future disputes regarding the patent pot of
gold beyond resolving the issues of patient contributors.
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